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Based on Amihud and Li's (2006) and DeAngelo, DeAngelo, and Skinner's (2004) findings on the 
"disappearing dividends" phenomenon documented by Fama and French (2001), we examine the 
relation between institutional holdings and information content of dividends across different payer 
groups. We find that the increase of institutional holdings mainly contribute to firms' declining 
information content of dividend change announcements, and this effect is stronger and 
concentrated in bottom payers. Furthermore, the change of holdings owned by institutional 
investors with different incentive to monitor a firm's governance has distinct effects on the decline 
of information content across top and bottom payers. Our results indicate that for top payers, only 
the increase of ownership held by motivated monitors is negatively associated with the information 
content of dividends. On the contrary, the information content conveyed by dividends in bottom 
payers is sensitive to all kinds of institutional holdings, including that are generally regarded as 
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1. Introduction  
 Despite the tax disadvantage to dividends, publicly traded industrial firms in the U.S. have 
historically had a preference to distribute cash to their shareholders through dividends. However, 
Fama and French (2001) report a general decline in the number of dividend-paying corporations 
and in the firms' propensity to pay since 1978, which is referred to as the "disappearing dividends" 
phenomenon. Subsequently, several studies have advanced possible explanations for this 
phenomenon, but the debate remains unresolved. Some commonly proposed explanations to 
interpret this puzzle include the substitution of repurchases for dividends (Grullon and Michaely, 
2002; Skinner, 2008), the increasing influence of institutional holdings (Amihud and Li, 2006), 
and the catering theory of dividends (Baker and Wurgler, 2004a; 2004b). On the other hand, 
DeAngelo, DeAngelo, and Skinner (2004) argue that dividends never disappeared. They find that 
despite the percentage of dividend payers having decreased since 1980s, the aggregate dollar 
dividends and real dividends have increased. The divergence between the decreasing number of 
dividend payers and the increasing dollar dividends denotes that dividends are highly concentrated 
in a minority of companies that display the largest proportion of aggregate earnings in the market. 
Amihud and Li (2006) hypothesize and find evidence that the growth in institutional investor 
holdings in publicly traded firms over the past few decades has reduced the information content of 
dividends, leading to a lower propensity to pay dividends. Because institutional investors are more 
informed and sophisticated, their trades "leak" a part of the information contained in dividends 
before dividends are announced. The information effect of institutional holdings leads to a 
disequilibrium such that the value of the information content cannot match its cost – the higher tax 
rate on dividends. Consequently, firms diminish their dividend payments. 
 The purpose of this paper is two-fold.  First, we argue that if the information content has 
declined for dividend payers as a result of more institutional holdings, this effect should be stronger 
and concentrated in the sample of bottom payers. Similar to DeAngelo et al. (2004), we observe 
that nearly 89.1 percent of the aggregate dividends are paid by the top 200 payers (top payers) 
while an additional 7.2% are paid by the next 200 firms (middle payers). Less than 4 percent of the 
aggregate dividend are paid by firms ranked 401 and above (bottom payers).  Bottom payers tend 
to be firms with low profitability and high growth opportunities.  By contrast, top and middle payers 
are large firms that have historically maintained a robust dividend policy.  In our sample, the 
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median number of institutions in large, middle and bottom payers is 392, 150 and 39, respectively. 
In addition, the top and middle payers hold a significantly high proportion of the outstanding equity 
and have a smaller change in the dividend yield compared to the bottom payers. The overall finding 
of a negative association between institutional holdings and the information content of dividends 
documented in Amihud and Li (2006) is, therefore, likely to be concentrated among the bottom 
payers.  In other words, firms that have maintained a regular and consistent dividend policy and 
have had more institutional shareholders, on average, should observe little change in the 
information content of dividends over time.  Second, we observe that Amihud and Li (2006) treat 
institutional holdings as a homogenous group. The heterogeneity among institutional investors, 
based on their investment horizon and investment preferences, can significantly affect the relation 
between institutional holdings and the information content of dividends.  We classify institutional 
investors into different groups by their incentive to monitor a firm's governance (following Fich, 
Harford, and Tran, 2015; and Bushee, 1998; 2001). Considering their roles in alleviating agency 
costs, if an institution is identified as motivated monitors by Fich et al. or dedicated institutions by 
Bushee, we categorize it into the group of strong-monitoring institutions; if it is identified as quasi-
indexers or transient institutions by Bushee, we categorize it into the weak-monitoring group. 
Moreover, we contend that the information content of dividends is only sensitive to the change of 
strong-monitoring institutional holdings. 
 To test our hypotheses, we regress the cumulative abnormal return (CAR) around a dividend 
increase, a measurement of information content, on the institutional holdings, denoted by INST, 
across the top, middle and bottom payers. We find that, in line with Amihud and Li's results, higher 
INST leads to lower CAR at dividend increase announcements for the full sample.  Parsing the data 
into top, middle and bottom payers, we find that the negative relation between INST and CAR is 
concentrated among bottom payers.  Both the range of growth and the influence of an increase in 
one unit in INST are more significant among bottom payers than top payers. Next, we split INST 
into strong-monitoring holdings (held by motivated monitors, denoted INST_MONITOR, or 
dedicated institutions, denoted INST_DED) and weak-monitoring holdings (held by quasi-indexers, 
denoted INST_QIX, or transient institutions, denoted INST_TRA), and find the following: (i) for 
top payers, only INST_MONITOR has significantly negative effect on CAR at dividend increase 
announcements; (ii) for bottom payers, besides INST_MONITOR, higher weak-monitoring 
institutional holdings also causes a significant decline in CAR. These results partly support our 
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hypotheses that the willingness of top payers to pay dividends lessens when the institutional 
holdings of motivated monitors rise, whereas the propensity of bottom payers to pay is negatively 
associated with overall institutional holdings.  
 Our study proceeds as follows. In section 2, we review relevant literature and propose our 
hypotheses. In section 3 we describe our sample and the definition of variables we use to examine 
the effect of institutional holdings on information content. Section 4 provides the methodology, 
and our empirical results and Section 5 contains our conclusions.  
2. Literature review and hypotheses 
2.1 Debate on disappearing dividends 
2.1.1 Disappearing dividends 
In their empirical study among US firms, Fama and French (2001) firstly document the 
phenomenon of disappearing dividends and show that the proportion of cash dividend payers 
decreased dramatically from 66.5% to 20.8% from 1978 to 2000. Denis and Osobov (2008) provide 
international evidence of disappearing dividends in Canada, UK, Germany, and France. Besides 
regular cash dividends, DeAngelo, DeAngelo, and Skinner (2000) find that special dividends are 
also disappearing. To interpret this trend, Fama and French explore two aspects of the decline: (i) 
the surge of new listings which have low profitability and strong growth opportunities – typical 
characteristics of non-payers, and (ii) the firms’ declining propensity to pay cash dividends over 
time.  
One strand of literature argues that the substitution of stock repurchases for cash dividends 
can explain firms' increasing reluctance to pay dividends. Grounded on the dividend irrelevance 
theorem of Miller and Modigliani (1961), Grullon and Michaely (2002) propose the tax-motivated 
substitution hypothesis. They reckon that newly-listed companies are inclined to choose 
repurchases to transfer cash to shareholders, and although mature corporations do not halt payment 
of cash dividends, they are also more likely to increase share repurchases payout. Bagwell and 
Shoven (1989), and Boukoudh, Michaely, Richardson, and Roberts (2007) present evidence that a 
surge of repurchases begins in the early 1980s accompanied by the sharp decline of dividends that 
Fama and French (2001) documented. Furthermore, Skinner (2008) confirms the findings of 
Grullon and Michaely (2002) and reports that the number of corporations which only pay regular 
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dividends declined rapidly, while the number of regular repurchases payers has been going up. 
Driven by the strong link with earnings, repurchases increasingly become the dominant form of 
cash payout regardless of which form the firm selected before. Besides, companies can use total 
payout to convey information (Bhattacharya, 1979; Miller and Rock, 1985) or minimize agency 
cost (Easterbrook, 1984; Jensen, 1986), whether through dividends or repurchases.  These theories 
partly support the substitution hypothesis. 
However, the replacement between repurchases and dividends can explain the 
disappearance of dividends to what extent is still not uniform. Grullon, Paye, Underwood, and 
Weston(2011) in their empirical research admit the substitution effect of repurchase, but they also 
find that the increase of repurchase cannot fully offset the decline of dividends. That is to say, the 
substitution of repurchases for the dividends can only partly settle the problem.  John and Williams 
(1985) propose that there is a signaling equilibrium between dividends and dilution, that is, 
dividends are regarded as the signal of valuable inside information, and the higher taxes on them 
are costs of the information in this equilibrium. Thus, dividends will not be substituted by 
repurchases in a market with asymmetric information and taxes.  In line with the conclusion of 
John and Williams (1985), Bernheim (1991) assume that the only difference between share 
repurchases and dividends is taxes, but he still supposes that firms will pay dividends rather than 
make repurchases. Moreover, Brav, Graham, Harvey, and Michaely (2005) examine the 
determinants of dividend and repurchase decisions, and find that dividend payments have 
continuity associated with sustainable earnings while repurchases fluctuate with temporary cash 
flows (coinciding with Jagannathan, Stephens, and Weisbach, 2000; Guay and Harford, 2000). 
These findings contradict the substitution of repurchases for dividends from their nature. 
Apart from the repurchase substitution hypothesis, Baker and Wurgler (2004a, 2004b) 
assert that the dividend payment decisions are determined by investors' preferences. As investors 
on the market prefer dividend paying firms, they will put a premium and vice versa. The empirical 
evidence also supports their conclusion not only in the post-1978 disappearing trend of dividends. 
They identify four distinct trends from 1963-2000 related to the relationship between the investors' 
preference and the firms' propensity to pay: the dividend premiums are positive in the mid-1960s 
and mid-1970s when firms are more willing to pay; and during the periods of 1969-1975 and 1978-
2000, the dividend premiums go negative with the decreasing number of dividend payers.  
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Finally, Amihud and Li (2006) provide another inference to address the disappearing 
dividends problem, which stems from the signaling theory. They attribute the disappearance of 
dividends to the decline of information content that dividend change announcements contain. The 
authors contend that dividends have declined as the information content of dividends has decreased 
over time with increasing institutional holdings. Generally, institution investors are considered as 
more informed and sophisticated.1 Thus, because institutional investors trade on their privileged 
information, the more ownership held by institutions, the larger part of the information contained 
by dividends will be corroded before the announcement.  In other words, when a dividend change 
is announced, the cumulative abnormal return (CAR) around this announcement is smaller for firms 
that have a higher level of institutional holdings. Consequently, managers will be less likely to use 
dividends as a signaling method because the low information content is not worth its cost – higher 
taxes on dividends.  
In summary, there is no single convincing explanation that can interpret the declining 
propensity of dividend payers completely. All the same, researchers have advanced several major 
interpretations to solve the disappearing dividends puzzle. First argument is based on the 
substitution of increasing share repurchases for the dividends payment. According to recent 
literature, repurchases have become a more desirable method for managers to distribute cash to 
shareholders, especially for growing firms with low profitability. Second explanation is premised 
on the implied investors' decreasing demand for dividends. Based on the catering theory, managers 
will pay dividends when investors put a premium on them. Thus, if this premium becomes negative, 
firms' propensity to pay will drop. Lastly, researchers have argued that the information content of 
dividend announcements has declined over time. The decline is due to the increase of ownership 
held by institutions that are more informed and sophisticated. They can access and process 
information before the dividend announcements are made, which leads to the use of dividends to 
convey information less efficiently and more costly. 
 
2.1.2 Non-disappearing Dividends 
 Many scholars argue that corporations' willingness to payout cash cannot simply be 
measured by the payouts of cash dividends or the number of dividend payers. DeAngelo, DeAngelo, 
                                                 
1 Empirically supported by Nofsinger and Sias (1999), Wermers (2000), Chen, Jegadeesh, and Wermers (2000), and Bennett, 
Sias, and Starks (2003). 
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and Skinner (2004) state that although the proportion of cash dividend payers experienced a 
significant decline as presented by Fama and French (2001), the total amount of dollar dividends 
and real dollar dividends have been climbing. This has resulted a high concentration of earnings 
and dividends among the most profitable industrial companies. However, they do not reject the 
assertion that firms' propensity to pay cash dividends has declined.  Skinner (2008) shows that 
managers are less likely to pay dividends since they use repurchases instead. Therefore, according 
to the findings of DeAngelo et al. (2004) and Skinner (2008), dividends never disappeared but 
firms are becoming more reluctant to pay dividends.  
 Instead of using the cash dividend or repurchase payout alone, Grullon, Paye, Underwood, 
and Weston (2011) argue that the net cash payout is a more appropriate indicator to reflect a 
corporation's cash distribution to its shareholders. The net payout is measured as dividends plus 
share repurchases minus equity issues. The research shows that despite firms' propensity to pay 
dividends having decreased, their propensity to pay net cash has not changed that much. In other 
words, although the reluctance of managers to pay dividends has increased in the last three decades, 
it does not mean firms' net cash disbursements are reducing.  
 Some recent literature provides evidence that cash dividends just disappeared temporarily 
and the trend is now reversing. Julio and Ikenberry (2004) propose that not only the proportion of 
dividend payers but also the firms' propensity to pay dividends have rebounded since it dropped to 
the lowest point in 2001. They suggest five plausible reasons: First, they focus on the impact of the 
Job and Growth Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2003, and find support that tax-cut is associated 
with this resurgence. This finding is also confirmed in studies of Blouin, Ready, and Shackelford 
(2004) and Chetty and Saez (2004). However, since the reversal occurs two years before the 
announcement of the tax cut, the explicit explanatory power of the tax-cut act is a matter of debate. 
Second, the authors argue that as an after effect of the Enron scandal of 2002, large firms with 
fewer growth opportunities need to use dividends again as a method to convey "high-quality" 
commitments and relieve agency conflicts. Third, based on the life-cycle theory, the authors note 
that newly listed firms with high growth and low profitability developed over a period and by early 
2000s they were mature enough to transform to dividend paying companies. Fourth, a firm's 
investment opportunities may influence its payout policy.  They predict that firms should "pay out 
whatever cannot be reinvested to earn the cost of capital" (p.91), yet their empirical results do not 
support this hypothesis, and hence rule this out as a possible explanation. Finally, consistent with 
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Baker and Wurgler's (2004b) catering theory, they test the relationship between the premiums and 
dividend payments but find no supporting evidence.  
 With regard to prior literature discussing possible reasons for the disappearing dividends 
phenomenon, we focus on the findings of DeAngelo et al. (2004) and Amihud and Li (2006). Both 
papers acknowledge that the number of dividend-paying firms and their propensity to pay has 
experienced a downward tendency over the past few decades, consistent with the empirical 
evidence in Fama and French (2001). The difference is that DeAngelo et al. (2004) do not consider 
this decline in conjunction with dividends' disappearance. They observe that the aggregate dollar 
dividends and real dollar dividends are on the rise and have become more concentrated, driven by 
more concentrated earnings. Specifically, dividends are dominated by the top payers that generate 
over half of industrial earnings, whereas the decreased number of payers mainly occurs among 
small payers that have poor performance and little contribution to the dividend payments. Despite 
the concentration in earnings and dividends, there has been a reduction in the propensity to pay 
dividends even among top payers.  Whereas 100% of firms with more than 250 million dollars in 
real earnings paid dividends in 1978, this proportion dropped to 78.7% in 2000.  This decline, 
however, is much less than the overall reduction in the proportion of dividend payers reported by 
Fama and French (2001) which is a decline from above 70% to below 30%. Because top payers 
tend to be large firms, maintain a consistent and robust dividend policy, and have more institutional 
investors, the change in information content of dividends for this group is expected to be small 
over time.  The negative relation between institutional holdings and the information content of 
dividends, as documented by Amihud and Li (2006) will vary among the top and bottom payers.  
We state our first hypothesis as follows: 
 
H1: After controlling for profitability and growth opportunities, the information content of 
dividends will be lower for firms with greater institutional holdings. This relation is expected 
to be stronger when the firms are bottom payers.  
 
2.2 Information content of dividends and institutional investor heterogeneity 
 The concept of the information content of dividends derives from asymmetric information 
and signaling theory. Ample literature establishes the rationale that dividends contain information 
in addition to that conveyed by earnings or other accounting indicators (e.g. Ross, 1977; 
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Bhattacharya, 1979; Kalay, 1980; Miller and Rock, 1985). Building on the information content 
hypothesis, some empirical evidence supports the view that information effect of dividend changes 
can be reflected by stock price response. Handjinicolaou and Kalay (1984) find that dividend 
decreases negatively affect stock returns. Similarly, Woolridge (1983) proposes that dividend 
increase announcements lead to positive abnormal returns and dividend decrease announcements 
are associated with negative abnormal returns. Thus, the abnormal returns can be used as a proxy 
to measure information content.  
 From this standpoint, Amihud and Li (2006) extend the study to the information effect of 
institutional holdings. They contend that the dividend is a costly signal when the firm attempts to 
obtain a signaling equilibrium. However, institutional investors' trade corrodes the information 
conveyed by dividends due to their information that is inaccessible for other participants in the 
market. As a result of the increasing institutional holdings, the costs of dividends – higher tax 
liabilities– are not endurable for managers, and the signaling balance is broken. Their empirical 
results show the negative correlation between the institutional holdings and the information content. 
Put another way, Boehmer and Kelley (2009) examine the relation between institutional holdings 
and the informational efficiency of stock prices, finding that a higher level of institutional 
ownership mitigates the information asymmetry through more informational efficient prices. Their 
work indirectly verifies Amihud and Li's findings.  
 In both articles, Amihud and Li (2006) and Boehmer and Kelley (2009) treat institutional 
ownership as homogeneous.  However, more recent studies distinguish institutional investors by 
their natures and assert that their trading and governance behaviors are distinct from each other. 
Yan and Zhang (2009) claim that institutional investors with different investment horizons are 
differentially informed. Short-term institutions are more active with better predictions of future 
stock returns and future earnings. Rather than simply differentiate investment horizons by using 
short- and long-term investors, Bushee (1998, 2001) sets up a system and classifies institutional 
investors into three categories: Dedicated, Quasi-indexers, and Transient institutions. Contrary to 
the dedicated investors, transient institutions with short-term trading and high portfolio turnover 
rates are less likely to monitor firms' operating performance.  Bushee and Goodman (2007) also 
add institutions' preference for growth or value companies as a criterion into their identification 
system. Similarly, Fich, Harford and Tran (2015) and Nagel, Qayyum and Roskelley (2015) define 
monitoring institutions as those whose ownerships of a stock rank in the top 10% of their portfolio 
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allocation. They show that the ownership held by monitoring institutions is positively associated 
with the firm's future payouts and performance.  
 Our next hypotheses relate dividends to explicitly classified institutional holdings. 
Following the classifications of Fich et al. (2015) and Bushee (1998, 2001), we categorize 
institutional investors into motivated monitors, dedicated institutions, quasi-indexers, and transient 
institutions. Bushee (1998) argues that similar to the motivated monitors, dedicated institutions 
have more monitoring incentive compared with quasi-indexers and transient institutions. We 
assume that the motivated monitors and dedicated institutions provide strong monitoring, while 
quasi-indexers and transient institutions provide weak monitoring. In line with Amihud and Li's 
(2006) rationale, institutions with higher motivation to monitor should incorporate more private 
information in their trades, i.e., the information conveyed by the dividend change announcements 
will be less, which has a negative effect on the information content of dividends. Accordingly, we 
hypothesize that the greater the ownership of strong-monitoring institutions the lower the 
information content of dividends. Based on the heterogeneous structure of institutional ownership, 
we state and test the following hypotheses: 
 
H2: After controlling for profitability and growth opportunities, the information content of 
dividends is negatively related to the ownership of the strong-monitoring institutions 
(ownership held by motivated monitors and dedicated institutions. We expect this relation to 
be stronger when the firms are bottom payers. 
  
H3: After controlling for profitability and growth opportunities, the information content of 
dividends is not related to the ownership of weak-monitoring institutions (ownership held by 
quasi-indexers and transient institutions). 
 
3. Data description and definition of variables 
3.1 Data selection 
We start with all regular dividend distributions on ordinary common stocks announced 
during 1981-2013 from the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) monthly file. Only cash 
dividends paid quarterly (CRSP distribution code 1232), monthly (1212), semi-annually (1222), 
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and with unspecified frequency (1242) are defined as regular dividend distributions. We also 
require that there are no announcements of other distributions or dividend distributions other than 
regular cash dividends in the -15 to +15 day window surrounding our dividend change 
announcement (Amihud and Li, 2006). Our initial events sample excludes all firms in financial 
(Standard Industrial Codes (SIC) ranges 4900-4949) or utilities industry (6000-6999). Following 
Fama and French (2001), the data consist of publicly traded NYSE, AMEX, and NASDAQ firms 
with CRSP share codes 10 or 11, which excludes REITs, American Depository Receipts (ADRs), 
closed-end funds, and firms not incorporated in the United States. Furthermore, announcements of 
firms without valid accounting data on Compustat (main tests sample) or missing December share 
price and quantity data are eliminated from our sample. These selection criteria generate a dividend 
change events sample comprising 13,675 dividend increase cases and 4066 dividend decrease cases 
over the whole period. We focus on the dividend increase announcements because in a certain year 
the number of dividend decrease announcements are not enough to conduct our tests. To analyze 
the discrepancy between top payers and bottom payers, we rank all firms by their total dollar 
dividends paid in each year in descending order and group them into top payers (ranked in top 200), 
middle payers (201-400), and bottom payers (401+). 
Next, we match the dividend increase events data with the institutional holdings data. We 
obtain the data from the quarterly reports in Form 13F to the SEC, which is gathered by Thomson-
Reuters Institutional Holdings 13F database (formerly known as CDA/Spectrum). All institutional 
investors with holdings of greater than $100 million or more in assets under management must 
disclose their common stock positions. The data of institutional investors who hold ADRs of a firm 
(Stock class description is "AR") are deleted from the sample.  
In addition, we introduce the institutions' classification developed by Bushee (1998) into 
our tests.2 This system classifies all institutional investors into Transient/Quasi-indexer/Dedicated 
institutions over 1981-2013. To be included in our final sample, a dividend increase announcement 
must have available financial statement data from Compustat and valid institutional holding data. 
This selection results in a final sample of 10,605 events over the whole period. 
 
                                                 
2 Our data source is Brian Bushee’s website (http://acct.wharton.upenn.edu/faculty/bushee/IIclass.html). 
 11 
 
3.2 Definition of variables and descriptive statistics 
3.2.1 Main variables 
Based on Woolridge's (1983) conclusions, we employ cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) 
around the dividend increase announcement day as a proxy of the information content. The 
variables CAR_(-1, +1), CAR_(0, +1), and CAR_(-11, +1) represent the cumulative abnormal 
returns over the window (-1, +1), (0, +1), and (-11, +1) where day 0 is defined as the dividend 
increase announcement day.  The CARs are calculated with the market model in Eventus using 
data directly from CRSP stock databases.  
Following Amihud and Li (2006), our main regressions adopt the change in dividend yield 
(𝐷𝐷𝐼𝑉𝑌𝑗) and institutional holdings (𝐼𝑁𝑆𝑇𝑗) as independent variables. The change in dividend yield, 
𝐷𝐷𝐼𝑉𝑌𝑗 , is calculated as 4 ∗ ∆𝐷𝐼𝑉𝐴𝑀𝑇𝑞 𝑃𝑅𝐶⁄ , where ∆𝐷𝐼𝑉𝐴𝑀𝑇𝑞  is the difference between 
dividend cash amount per share (DIVAMT) of current quarter and previous quarter, and PRC is the 
price at the end of the month when the dividend change is announced. The institutional holdings, 
𝐼𝑁𝑆𝑇𝑗 , is the proportion of ownership held by institutional investors to the firm's total shares 
outstanding at the end of the quarter before the dividend change announcement. 
Concerning the effect of institutional investors' monitoring, we further classify institutional 
investors into strong- and weak-monitoring institutions through two methods. The first is proposed 
by Fich et al. (2015) to identify motivated monitors. If an institution assigns a weight to a firm 
when it constructs a portfolio, and this weight ranks in the top 10 percent of the institution's 
portfolio allocation, then the institution is classified as a motivated monitor of this firm. The portion 
of ownership held by all motivated monitors to the total shares outstanding of a firm is the firm's 
monitoring institutional holdings (INST_MONITOR), and the number of all motivated monitors in 
it is the number of monitoring institutions (NO_MONITOR). Because motivated monitors focus 
efforts on the stock with high weights in their portfolio, we reckon that these institutional investors 
supply strong monitoring. The second approach follows Bushee's (1998, 2001) classification 
method of institutions. Based on their past investment patterns, including portfolio turnover, 
diversification, and momentum trading, this approach categorizes institutional investors into three 
groups: dedicated, quasi-indexer, and transient. Dedicated institutional owners are partly similar to 
the motivated monitors we formerly defined. Thus, this kind of institutions is regarded as strong-
monitoring institutions as well.  Quasi-indexer and transient owners are weak-monitoring 
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institutions. Quasi-indexers mimic a certain index and adopt a passive buy-and-hold strategy with 
little portfolio turnover.  Transient institutions are the most active group with a short term focus 
and high portfolio turnover. Both these groups have minimal incentives to provide strong 
monitoring.  We calculate the percentage of shares owned in the firm by these three kinds of 
institutions (INST_DED, INST_QIX, and INST_TRA) and the number of each kind of these 
institutions (NO_DED, NO_QIX, and NO_TRA), respectively. These variables are used to examine 
our Hypothesis 2 and 3.  
Panel A of Table 1 presents summary statistics of all variables for every payer group. 
Compared with that of top payers, the information content at dividend changes announced by 
bottom payers is more left-skewed.  For instance, the mean CAR for the window (0, +1) in bottom 
payers is 0.75%, and the median CAR is 0.32%, while this differential between the average and 
the median CAR among top payers is only 0.08%. The skewness in abnormal returns reflects that 
among bottom payers half the dividend change announcements contain a lower level of information 
content. This indicates that relative to other groups of dividend payers, bottom payers may have 
less motivation to pay dividends as a signal.  
Turning to the institutional holdings and monitoring proxies, we find that the percent of 
shares held by top payers and middle payers are broadly equal but significantly larger than that 
held by bottom payers. Meanwhile, the number of institutional investors of top payers is greater 
than the other two groups, reflecting that the ownership is more diverse among top payers. This 
fact is also proved by the motivated monitoring institutional holdings. On average, 108 motivated 
monitoring institutions account for 39.4% of top payers' ownership, whereas only about two 
institutions that hold 6.3% of shares have the incentive to monitor bottom payers.  
Panel B shows the significant difference tests of each variable between the top payer and 
bottom payers. As can be seen from the table, except the median of CARs, every variable of top 
payers essentially differs from that of bottom payers. This may confirm our hypothesis that the 
investment patterns of institutional investors of the top payers and bottom payers are different.  
 
3.2.2 Control variables 
 To control for firm characteristics possibly related to payout policy, we include five control 
variables into our multivariate regression analysis (Nagel et al., 2015; Grullon et al., 2011): 
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 1. Firm size (SIZE), calculated as the natural logarithm of total sales (Compustat item 12) 
in millions of dollars; 
 2. Return on assets (ROA), calculated as the ratio of the operating income before 
depreciation (Compustat item 13) to the book value of total assets (Compustat item 6);  
 3. Retained earnings (RE), calculated as the retained earnings (Compustat item 36) divided 
by the book value of total assets (Compustat item 6); 
 4. Market-to-Book ratio (MB), calculated as the market value of equity scaled by the book 
value of common equity (Compustat item 60), where the market value of equity is measured as 
common shares outstanding (Compustat item 25) times the fiscal year price (Compustat item 199);  
 5. Average sales growth rate (SGR), calculated as the mean of three-year sales growth rate, 
which is the annual change in total sales (Compustat item 12). 
 We use these variables to control a firm's capitalization (firm size), profitability (return on 
assets and retained earnings), and growth opportunities (market-to-book value and average sales 
growth rate). The descriptive statistics and comparison tests between the top and bottom payers for 
the control variables are also presented in Table 1.  
 
 
4. Methodology and empirical results 
4.1 Model design 
 Following Amihud and Li (2006), we employ two methods of multivariate regression 
analysis to test our hypotheses, namely, pooled regression and the Fama-MacBeth method. For 
pooled regressions, we use all observations in the regression and define a series of dummy variables 
to control for industry and year fixed effect. For Fama-MacBeth regressions, we firstly estimate 
the cross-sectional regressions year by year, and then compute the weighted average of annual 
coefficients for each variable, using their squared standard errors got from the annual regressions 
as the weights.3  
To examine our first hypothesis, especially to investigate whether the distinct effect 
between the top payers and bottom payers exists, we not only regress the model on the full sample 
                                                 
3 In order to control for heteroscedasticity, we use heteroscedasticity-consistent standard errors (also known as White 
standard errors) in our calculations. 
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with group dummies and interactions that indicate the occurrence of top, middle, or bottom payers, 
but also conduct the regressions on the subsamples, splitting the full sample into three payer groups. 
The regressions are formulated as follow. 
The pooled regression models on the full sample are 
(4-1) 𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑗 = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1𝐷𝐷𝐼𝑉𝑌𝑗 + 𝛼2𝐼𝑁𝑆𝑇𝑗 + 𝛼3𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑗 + 𝛼4𝑅𝐸𝑗 + 𝛼5𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑗 + 𝛼6𝑀𝐵𝑗 +
                              𝛼7𝑆𝐺𝑅𝑗 + ∑ 𝛼8𝑚𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑗𝑚
12
𝑚=1 + ∑ 𝛼9𝑛𝑌𝐸𝐴𝑅𝑗𝑛
33
𝑛=1 + 𝑒𝑗  
(4-2) 𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑗 = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1𝐷𝐷𝐼𝑉𝑌𝑗 + 𝛼2𝐼𝑁𝑆𝑇𝑗 + 𝛼3𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦_𝑇𝑂𝑃 + 𝛼4𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦_𝑀𝐼𝐷 +
                             𝛼5𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑗 + 𝛼6𝑅𝐸𝑗 + 𝛼7𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑗 + 𝛼8𝑀𝐵𝑗 + 𝛼9𝑆𝐺𝑅𝑗 + ∑ 𝛼10𝑚𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑗𝑚
12
𝑚=1 +
                             ∑ 𝛼11𝑛𝑌𝐸𝐴𝑅𝑗𝑛
33
𝑛=1 + 𝑒𝑗 
(4-3) 𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑗 = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1𝐷𝐷𝐼𝑉𝑌𝑗 + 𝛼2𝐼𝑁𝑆𝑇𝑗 + 𝛼3𝐷𝐷𝐼𝑉𝑌_𝑇𝑂𝑃 + 𝛼4𝐼𝑁𝑆𝑇_𝑇𝑂𝑃 +
                             𝛼5𝐷𝐷𝐼𝑉𝑌_𝑀𝐼𝐷 +  𝛼6𝐼𝑁𝑆𝑇_𝑀𝐼𝐷 + 𝛼7𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑗 + 𝛼8𝑅𝐸𝑗 + 𝛼9𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑗 + 𝛼10𝑀𝐵𝑗 +
                             𝛼11𝑆𝐺𝑅𝑗 + ∑ 𝛼12𝑚𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑗𝑚
12
𝑚=1 + ∑ 𝛼13𝑛𝑌𝐸𝐴𝑅𝑗𝑛
33
𝑛=1 + 𝑒𝑗 
 
The Fama-MacBeth regressions on the full sample for each year are identical with the regressions 
above but drop year dummies (𝑌𝐸𝐴𝑅𝑗). The model is estimated for CARs on three time windows: 
days -1 to +1 (CAR_(-1, +1)), days 0 to +1 (CAR_(0, +1)), and days -11 to +1 (CAR_(-11, +1)). 
Dummy_TOP and Dummy_MID are dummy variables that identify payers. If a firm ranks as a top 
payer, then Dummy_TOP equals 1; if it ranks as a middle payer, then Dummy_MID equals 1; 
otherwise, both variables equal 0. DDIVY_TOP, INST_TOP, DDIVY_MID and INST_MID are 
interactions obtained with DDIVY and INST interact with Dummy_TOP and Dummy_MID.4 The 
model includes year dummies in the pooled regressions and industry dummies in both methods. 
𝑌𝐸𝐴𝑅𝑗𝑛 equals 1 if the dividend change announcement of firm j is made in year n, otherwise equals 
0. 𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑗𝑚 controls industry fixed effect. If the firm j that announces a dividend change is in industry 
m, then the dummy variable equals 1, otherwise equals 0. We split all firms into 13 industry groups, 
using two digit SIC code (following Lo and Wang, 2006).  
Based on the findings in Amihud and Li's (2006), for Hypothesis 1, we expect that α1 >0 
and α2 < 0.  Based on our hypothesis, we expect the coefficients of group dummies (α3 and α4 in 
regression 4-2) to be positive. That is to say, compared with bottom payers, institutional holdings 
                                                 
4 Detailed definition can be seen in Appendix 1. 
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in top payers and middle payers have a less negative effect on the information content. Furthermore, 
the interaction terms in regression 4-3 examine the differences in the three payer groups after 
controlling for change in dividend yield and institutional holdings for each payer group.   
For regressions on subsamples, we conduct regressions (4-1) on top payer, middle payer, 
and bottom payers, comparing the coefficients and their significance of each variable across the 
three groups. We predict that α2 in bottom payers is negative and significant, and its absolute value 
is larger than those of the other two groups.  
 To study whether the ownership held by strong-monitoring institutional investors affects 
the information content of dividend changes differently compared to weak-monitoring institutional 
investors, we combine variables for motivated monitors and institutions labeled by Bushee's 
classification with payer group dummies. Therefore, the equations we estimate are as follows. 
The pooled regressions on the full sample are 
(4-4) 𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑗 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐷𝐷𝐼𝑉𝑌𝑗 + 𝛽2𝑁𝑂_𝑀𝑂𝑁𝐼𝑇𝑂𝑅𝑗 + 𝛽3𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦_𝑇𝑂𝑃 + 𝛽4𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦_𝑀𝐼𝐷 +
                             𝛽5𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑗 + 𝛽6𝑅𝐸𝑗 + 𝛽7𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑗 + 𝛽8𝑀𝐵𝑗 + 𝛽9𝑆𝐺𝑅𝑗 + ∑ 𝛽10𝑚𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑗𝑚
12
𝑚=1 +
                             ∑ 𝛽11𝑛𝑌𝐸𝐴𝑅𝑗𝑛
33
𝑛=1 + 𝑒𝑗  
(4-5) 𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑗 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐷𝐷𝐼𝑉𝑌𝑗 + 𝛽2𝐼𝑁𝑆𝑇_𝑀𝑂𝑁𝐼𝑇𝑂𝑅𝑗 + 𝛽3𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦_𝑇𝑂𝑃 +
                             𝛽4𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦_𝑀𝐼𝐷 + 𝛽5𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑗 + 𝛽6𝑅𝐸𝑗 + 𝛽7𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑗 + 𝛽8𝑀𝐵𝑗 + 𝛽9𝑆𝐺𝑅𝑗 +
                             ∑ 𝛽10𝑚𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑗𝑚
12
𝑚=1 + ∑ 𝛽11𝑛𝑌𝐸𝐴𝑅𝑗𝑛
33
𝑛=1 + 𝑒𝑗 
(4-6) 𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑗 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐷𝐷𝐼𝑉𝑌𝑗 + 𝛽2𝑁𝑂_𝐼𝑁𝑆𝑇_𝐷𝐸𝐷𝑗 + 𝛽3𝑁𝑂_𝐼𝑁𝑆𝑇_𝑄𝐼𝑋𝑗 +
                             𝛽4𝑁𝑂_𝐼𝑁𝑆𝑇_𝑇𝑅𝐴𝑗 + 𝛽5𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦_𝑇𝑂𝑃 + 𝛽6𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦_𝑀𝐼𝐷 + 𝛽7𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑗 +
                             𝛽8𝑅𝐸𝑗 + 𝛽9𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑗 + 𝛽10𝑀𝐵𝑗 + 𝛽11𝑆𝐺𝑅𝑗 + ∑ 𝛽12𝑚𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑗𝑚
12
𝑚=1 +
                             ∑ 𝛽13𝑛𝑌𝐸𝐴𝑅𝑗𝑛
33
𝑛=1 + 𝑒𝑗 
(4-7) 𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑗 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐷𝐷𝐼𝑉𝑌𝑗 + 𝛽2𝐼𝑁𝑆𝑇_𝐷𝐸𝐷𝑗 + 𝛽3𝐼𝑁𝑆𝑇_𝑄𝐼𝑋𝑗 + 𝛽4𝐼𝑁𝑆𝑇_𝑇𝑅𝐴𝑗 +
                             𝛽5𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦_𝑇𝑂𝑃 + 𝛽6𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦_𝑀𝐼𝐷 + 𝛽7𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑗 + 𝛽8𝑅𝐸𝑗 + 𝛽9𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑗 +
                             𝛽10𝑀𝐵𝑗 + 𝛽11𝑆𝐺𝑅𝑗 + ∑ 𝛽12𝑚𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑗𝑚
12
𝑚=1 + ∑ 𝛽13𝑛𝑌𝐸𝐴𝑅𝑗𝑛
33
𝑛=1 + 𝑒𝑗 
The Fama-MacBeth regressions on the full sample for each year are identical with the regressions 
above but drop year dummies (𝑌𝐸𝐴𝑅𝑗). The monitoring effect of institutional investors is measured 
by the number of each kind of institutions and the percentage of ownership they hold. As stated in 
Hypothesis 2 and 3, if the strong-monitoring institutional holdings make dividend change 
announcements less informative, we expect that β2 < 0 in all regressions. The influence of weak-
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monitoring institutional investors is tested in regression (4-6) and (4-7) at the same time. By 
contrast, we expect the estimations of weak-monitoring institutions (β3, β4, β5, and β6 ) are 
insignificant. The reduced models without group dummies (Dummy_TOP and Dummy_MID) are 
also regressed on the subsamples to examine these assumptions. The prospect resembles 
Hypotheses 2 and 3, i.e., larger strong-monitoring institutional holdings in bottom payers diminish 
more information conveyed by dividend change announcement than top payers, which is not 
applicable to weak-monitoring institutions.  
 
4.2 Empirical results 
4.2.1 Effect of overall institutional holdings 
 We firstly examine the pattern of dividend payers over time in accordance with DeAngelo 
et al. (2004). Figure 1 tracks the number of all payers, financial and utility industry payers, and 
industrial payers from 1975 to 2014. Conforming to Fama and French (2001), there exists a notable 
"disappearance" among industrial firms that tend to pay dividends over 1982-2002, yet the 
tendency of dividend-paying financials and utilities rises first and then falls over the period. As 
stated by DeAngelo et al., this mismatching precludes a unified external factor that causes the 
decline in the number of industrial firms, such as tax law changes. Moreover, on top of it, the figure 
refutes the "reappearing dividends" as well. Although the reduction of dividend-paying industrial 
corporations seems to end in 2002, the reversal does not actually appear thereafter.5  
 In DeAngelo et al.'s study, dividend-paying is concentrated in a handful of top payers, while 
large numbers of small dividend payers halt their payments, accounting for the decline in the 
number of dividend payers. Thus, we inspect the dividend concentration for each year and present 
it in Table 2. As can be seen from the table, there is an upward tendency of the concentration in 
dividends paid by industrial firms ranked as top 200 over time, from 85.93% in 1975 to the peak 
of 94.75% in 2002, but the range is slight. The proportion of dividends paid by bottom payers 
(firms ranked 401 and above) is relatively stable, around 3.71% on average, which partly weakens 
the explanatory power of DeAngelo et al.'s interpretation. 
                                                 
5 For robustness, we conduct comparison tests on the cumulative abnormal returns before and after 2002, the results 
show that the there is no significant reversal trend in the so-called "reappearing" period. 
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 The results of Amihud and Li (2006) cast light on this situation. They contend that 
disappearing dividends are due to the loss of information conveyed by dividend, resulting from the 
surge of institutional holdings. Figure 2 demonstrates the trends of institutional holdings, and our 
innovative effort here is dividing the sample into top, middle, and bottom payer groups 
corresponding to what DeAngelo et al. have done. The institutional holdings across all three groups 
have virtually increased. While the percentage of shares owned by institutional investors in top 
payers rose from 44.07% in 1980 to 72.74% in 2014, the bottom payers' institutional holdings have 
quadrupled over time from 15.69% to 67.90%. The figure partially supports the information effect 
of institutional holdings on the dividend change announcements and our first hypothesis that the 
variations of institutional holdings for different payer groups are not the same, leading to a 
distinctly negative effect on information content. 
 Furthermore, we formally test the effect of an increase of one unit in institutional holdings 
on the information content across groups by regressing CARs on it. Table 3 reports the estimated 
regressions on the full sample.  Hypothesis 1 is partly supported by the results of pooled regressions 
in Panel A. The coefficient of INST is significantly negative, which is consistent with Amihud and 
Li's (2006) conclusions. However, the coefficients of top group dummy and its interaction item 
multiplied by INST are marginally significant. That is to say, the negative effect of each unit 
increase of institutional holdings brings to the CARs is barely the same across the top and bottom 
payers. There may be two interpretation for this divergence from our expectation: (i) most of 
information effect is captured by INST as the magnitude of institutional holdings' increase is 
different across groups (presented in Fig 2); (ii) because the ownership held by institutions are not 
homogeneous, only the change of certain segment of institutional holdings will act on the 
information content. These findings can also be seen from Fama-MacBeth regressions on CAR_(-
11, +1), α2 = -0.0202 (t = -3.97) for model (4-1), α2 = -0.0203 (t = -4.18) for model (4-2), and α2 = 
-0.0175 (t = -3.20) for model (4-3). Although not all the coefficients of INST in regressions on the 
other two time windows are significant, the signs of them are consistent with our hypothesis.  
To clarify the effect of institutional holdings across all three payer groups more specifically, 
we re-estimate regression (4-1) on subsamples by splitting the sample into three groups: the top, 
middle, and bottom payers. The results of pooled regressions in Panel A of Table 4 strongly support 
Hypothesis 1. For instance, in regressions of the time window (0, +1), a 100 basis point increase in 
institutional holding among bottom payers would generate a 0.0109% decrease in CAR. 
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Nevertheless, the change of top payers' CAR responds to the increase of institutional holding by 
the same scale would be almost zero. However, the results for Fama-MacBeth regressions in Panel 
B are as not expected. The estimations of INST across three groups are not significantly different 
from each other, and even opposite in their signs. We suppose that this may result from the effect 
of extreme values for certain years with large standard errors used to calculate the weighted average. 
Thus, we contend that when the institutional holdings increase by 1%, its negative effect on 
information content will be more remarkable among bottom payers. Therefore, it is necessary to 
explore the distinctive effect of different segments of institutional investors, to test if it is consistent 
with our Hypotheses 2 and 3.  
 
4.2.2 Effect of institutional holdings with distinct incentive to monitor 
 We plot the annual average ownership held by motivated monitors (INST_MONITOR), 
dedicated institutions (INST_DED), quasi-indexers (INST_QIX), and transient institutions 
(INST_TRA) across payer groups from 1981 to 2013 in Figure 3, similar to what was done on the 
overall institutional holdings (INST). Figure 3 shows that although all four kinds of institutions 
increased their holdings over the period, the patterns of strong-monitoring investors' ownership 
(held by motivated monitors and dedicated institutions) across groups are not as expected. 
Specifically, in contrast to the pattern of overall institutional holdings, the percentage of motivated 
monitors' holding in top payers has the biggest jump from 18.68% in 1981 to 48.94% in 2013, 
while the change of bottom payers is only 5.71% (graph (a) in Fig. 3). For dedicated institutions, 
they occupy the slightest portion of ownership (less than 12%) among all three institution groups 
throughout the period. As can be seen from the graph (b) in Fig. 3, the percentage of shares owned 
by dedicated institutions goes up to the peak in the mid-2000s and then falls sharply to almost the 
same level in early 1980s in all three groups. Whereas, the trend of quasi-indexers' holdings is quite 
the same as that of the overall institutional holdings shown in graph (c). The average proportion of 
quasi-indexers' ownership to the total shares outstanding in the bottom dividend-paying firms 
increases by 33.62%, which is more than the 18.46% of top payers and the 26.94% of middle payers. 
An upward tendency of transient institutions' holdings is also observed across all payer groups in 
the graph (d).  
 To examine our Hypothesis 2 and 3, we regress CARs on two kinds of proxies that measure 
the motivation of institutions with different incentives to monitor: the number and proportional 
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holdings of motivated monitors, and the number and proportional holdings owned by institutions 
categorized by Bushee's (1988, 2001) classification. Table 5 provides details for regressions using 
variables for motivated monitors on the full sample. For pooled regressions (Panel A), the 
coefficients of INST_MONITOR and Dummy_TOP are significant and opposite in signs as 
expected; that is, the increase of motivated monitors' holdings negatively associated with CARs, 
and the negative effect is less among top payers. This finding is verified by results of regressions 
conducted on subsamples (Panel A in Table 6). Once again, the institutional holdings of motivated 
monitors have a negative relation with CARs, and not only that, the absolute value of the 
estimations in bottom payers are larger than those in top payers. As graph (a) of Fig. 3 shows, the 
holdings of motivated monitors has increased sharply over time resulting in a reduction in the 
information content of dividends. However, the results of Fama-MacBeth regressions on the full 
sample and subsamples (Panel B of Table 5 and Table 6) are still not consistent with our expectation. 
Thus, combining the pooled regressions' results in Table 5 and Table 6, we conclude that the 
increase of shares owned by motivated monitors lower the information content conveyed by 
dividend change announcements, and the same scale of monitoring institutional holdings' increase 
leads to larger information content decline among bottom payers.  
 Table 7 shows results of model estimations using institutional variables defined by Bushee's 
classification on the full sample. In these regressions, we categorize dedicated institutions as 
strong-monitoring institutions, quasi-indexers and transient institutions as weak-monitoring 
investors. From the table, we can find that the coefficients of NO_DED are insignificant, while the 
coefficients of NO_QIX and NO_TRA are significant or marginally significant for both methods. 
This relation can also be seen in the pooled regressions of institutional holdings variables across 
institution groups on CARs. The unexpected result may partly due to the distribution of these three 
kinds of institutional holdings (see graph (b), (c), and (d) in Fig 3).  The holdings held by dedicated 
institutions take up the smallest proportions of a firm's total shares outstanding, which fluctuate 
between 3% and 12% throughout the whole period across all three groups. However, the increasing 
sum of shares owned by quasi-indexers and transient institutions accounts for over half of the total 
ownership.  
 Although the results are contradictory to our expectation, we still test the models on 
subsamples. In Panel A of Table 8, the significance level of coefficients of INST_QIX and 
INST_TRA in bottom payers is higher than the other two groups, especially top payers. Although 
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this relation is not explicit in Fama-MacBeth regressions, these findings can partly indicate that the 
impact of weak-monitoring institutional holdings' change is not insignificant. The information 
content of dividend changes in bottom payers is corroded by the increase of ownership held by all 
kinds of institutional investors, including transient institutions which are widely considered as with 
no regard to firms' governance. Overall, these results partly reject our Hypothesis 3.  
 
5. Conclusions 
Plenty of studies have investigated the disappearing dividends phenomenon documented 
by Fama and French (2001) and proposed various theories to explain it. Nonetheless, the evidence 
presented seems inconclusive. In their empirical study, DeAngelo et al. (2004) suppose that the 
decline in the number of dividend-paying firms does not mean that dividends have disappeared. 
They find that the aggregate dollar dividends and real dollar dividends are increasing and 
concentrated among a handful of highly profitable firms. Conversely, Amihud and Li (2006) trace 
the decrease of firms' propensity to pay to the decline of information content at dividend news. 
Furthermore, they argue that this decline is caused by increasing institutional holdings whose trades 
lessen the information contained by dividends. Based on the findings of both articles, we conjecture 
that the increase of institutional holdings mainly contribute to firms' declining information content 
of dividend change announcements, and the scale of this negative effect is different between top 
payers and bottom payers. Besides, the change of shares held by institutional investors with 
different incentive to monitor a firm's governance has distinct effects on the decline of information 
content across top and bottom payers. 
We test our hypotheses by multivariate regressions. Our results show that (i) a higher level 
of institutional holdings is negatively associated with the information content of dividend change 
announcements, measured by cumulative abnormal returns, across all kinds of payers. Moreover, 
compared to that of top payers, the effect of increasing one unit at institutional holdings is larger 
in bottom payers; (ii) the negative impact of the overall institutional holdings' change is mixed in 
top payers. By recognizing institutions' incentive to monitor, it can be seen that only the increase 
of ownership held by motivated monitors drives the decline of information content in top payers; 
(iii) contrary to that of top payers, the information content conveyed by dividends in bottom payers 
is sensitive to all kinds of institutional holdings, including that are generally regarded as 
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unconcerned about firms' governance. These findings support our expectation that despite the 
growth of dollar dividends that are mostly paid by top payers, the propensity of top payers to pay 
is declining due to the decrease of information content of dividend changes caused by the rise of 
motivated monitoring institutions' holdings. Also for bottom payers, the overall institutional 
holdings, not only the strong-monitoring institutional holdings, have a greater negative impact on 
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Appendix 1 Definition of variables 
Variable Definition Source
CAR_(-1, +1) The cumulative abnormal return over the window (-1,+1) CRSP; Eventus
CAR_(0, +1) The cumulative abnormal return over the window (0,+1) CRSP; Eventus
CAR_(-11, +1) The cumulative abnormal return over the window (-11,+1) CRSP; Eventus
Independent variables
DDIVYj The increase in dividend yield of firm j, which is calculated as (DIVAMTj of current year – DIVAMTj of previous year)/ Pricej. CRSP
INSTj The institutional holdings of firm j, which is calculated as the total institutional ownership of firm j/ the total shares outstanding of firm j. Thomson Reuters (13f)
NO_MONITORj The number of institutions whose holding value of firm j is in the top 10% of the institution's portforlio (following Fich, Harford, and Tran (forthcoming)). Thomson Reuters (13f)
INST_MONITORj The total ownership of monitoring institutions as a proportion of the total shares outstanding of firm j (following Fich, Harford, and Tran (forthcoming)). Thomson Reuters (13f)
NO_DEDj The number of institutions who hold value of firm j and be classified as "dedicated" by Bushee (2001). Thomson Reuters (13f); Bushee's dataset
INST_DEDj The quarterly ownership held by dedicated institutions,which is calculated as the institutional ownership held by dedicated institutions of firm j/ the total shares outstanding of firm j. Thomson Reuters (13f); Bushee's dataset
NO_QIXj The number of institutions who hold value of firm j and be classified as "quasi-indexer" by Bushee (2001). Thomson Reuters (13f); Bushee's dataset
INST_QIXj The quarterly ownership held by quasi-indexer institutions,which is calculated as the institutional ownership held by quasi-indexer institutions of firm j/ the total shares outstanding
of firm j.
Thomson Reuters (13f); Bushee's dataset
NO_TRAj The number of institutions classified as who hold value of firm j and be "transient" by Bushee (2001). Thomson Reuters (13f); Bushee's dataset
INST_TRAj The quarterly ownership held by transient institutions,which is calculated as the institutional ownership held by transient institutions of firm j/ the total shares outstanding of firm j. Thomson Reuters (13f); Bushee's dataset
Dummy_TOP Equals 1 if the payer ranks in the top 200 in given year, otherwise equals 0. Compustat; CRSP
Dummy_MID Equals 1 if the firm announced dividend before 2002, otherwise equals 0. Compustat; CRSP
Dummy_yeari Equals 1 if the firm made announcement in the year i, otherwise equals 0. Compustat; CRSP
Dummy_groupn Equals 1 if the firm that announced dividend is in industry group n, which is classified according to Lo and Wang (2001); otherwise equals 0. Compustat; CRSP
DDIVY_TOP DDIVY multiplied by the dummy variable Dummy_TOP. Compustat; CRSP
INST_TOP INST multiplied by the dummy variable Dummy_TOP. Compustat; CRSP; Thomson Reuters (13f)
DDIVY_MID DDIVY multiplied by the dummy variable Dummy_MID. Compustat; CRSP
INST_MID INST multiplied by the dummy variable Dummy_MID. Compustat; CRSP; Thomson Reuters (13f)
Control variables
SIZEj The natural logarithm of total sales of firm j. Compustat
ROAj The ratio of EBITDA to total asset of firm j. Compustat
REj The ratio of retained earnings to total asset of firm j. Compustat
MBj The firm j's market value of equity divided by the its book value of equity. Compustat
SGRj The average of growth rate in sales over the most recent 3 years preceding the dividend announcement. Compustat
Monitoring variables
Dependent variables
Dummy variables and Interactions
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Tables and Figures 




Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median t-value p-value z-value p-value
Dependent variables
CAR_(-1, +1) 0.0053 0.0044 0.0040 0.0019 0.0081 0.0034 -2.98 0.0029 -0.1709 0.8643
CAR_(0, +1) 0.0048 0.0040 0.0036 0.0021 0.0075 0.0032 -3.29 0.001 -0.5179 0.6045
CAR_(-11, +1) 0.0054 0.0064 0.0042 0.0038 0.0084 0.0038 -1.86 0.0631 0.1337 0.8936
Main variables
DDIVY 0.0051 0.0024 0.0058 0.0021 0.0068 0.0025 -2.09 0.037 -2.9913 0.0028
INST 0.6420 0.6598 0.6181 0.6406 0.4343 0.4065 42.88 <.0001 35.2148 <.0001
NO_INST 482.7472 392 173.2733 150 59.5782 39 68.3 <.0001 71.0379 <.0001
Monitor variables
INST_MONITOR 0.3940 0.4045 0.1852 0.1567 0.0633 0.0239 95.89 <.0001 68.0341 <.0001
NO_MONITOR 108.3371 54 11.7146 7 1.9959 1 38.44 <.0001 73.0731 <.0001
INST_DED 0.0748 0.0572 0.0721 0.0517 0.0516 0.0230 13.55 <.0001 27.7677 <.0001
NO_DED 11.6895 10 5.2525 5 2.2345 2 68.96 <.0001 67.9644 <.0001
INST_QIX 0.4475 0.4542 0.4129 0.4218 0.2925 0.2732 44.55 <.0001 37.8665 <.0001
NO_QIX 345.8570 274 115.5880 101 39.4814 27 67.2 <.0001 71.5865 <.0001
INST_TRA 0.1065 0.0980 0.1214 0.1046 0.0821 0.0559 15.11 <.0001 22.5193 <.0001
NO_TRA 100.5945 85 44.9636 35 15.7036 8 62.43 <.0001 64.3651 <.0001
Control variables
SIZE 9.0571 8.9631 7.3912 7.3908 5.6567 5.6839 116.56 <.0001 71.0027 <.0001
RE 0.3958 0.3889 0.4134 0.4096 0.4204 0.4138 -4.1 <.0001 -6.1466 <.0001
ROA 0.1836 0.1759 0.1858 0.1761 0.1787 0.1705 2.87 0.0041 4.3467 <.0001
MB ratio 3.3273 2.8337 2.8691 2.4811 2.2425 1.9006 26.47 <.0001 29.1222 <.0001
SGR 0.0953 0.0757 0.1039 0.0886 0.1150 0.0967 -6.26 <.0001 -9.3828 <.0001
NO. of Events
This table presents the descriptive statistics and comparison ttest statistics between top payers and bottom payers. Our sample
contains all the dividend increase announcements without other distributions in a (-15, +15) window over 1981 to 2013. The whole
sample is divided into three subsamples: top payers, middle payers, and bottom payers, by cash dividends paid in certain year. Firms
are defined as top or middle payers if they rank in top 200 or 201-400 in year i, otherwise are defined as bottom payers. Panel A
reports the descriptive statistics of all variables we used in main regressions, and Panel B reports the significant difference of mean
and median between top and bottom payers. The definitions of all variables are given in Appendix.
Table 1: Descriptive Statistics
2895 2558 5152
Top Payers vs Bottom Payers
Median
Panel A: Descriptive statistics summary
Top Middle Bottom Mean
Panel B: Comparison ttest statistics
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Figure 1 The number of dividend payers on CRSP 
 
  
Fig.1. The number of dividend payers on CRSP, 1975-2014. The CRSP sample includes firms who pay regular cash dividends (CRSP distribution code is 
1212, 1222, 1232 or 1242) and be traded on NYSE, AMEX, and NASDAQ with share codes of 10 or 11. Firms must have non-missing December price 








no. of industrial payers no. of financial & utility payers no. of all payers
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Table 2 Concentration of total dividends paid by industrial payers 
 
Year Top 100 101-200 Subtotal 201-300 301-400 Subtotal 401-500 ≥500 Subtotal
1975 74.63 11.30 85.93 5.44 2.87 8.30 2.07 3.70 5.77
1976 72.64 11.90 84.55 5.77 3.29 9.06 2.24 4.15 6.39
1977 71.92 12.39 84.31 5.91 3.39 9.30 2.26 4.13 6.39
1978 72.23 12.36 84.59 5.78 3.39 9.17 2.25 4.00 6.24
1979 73.95 11.95 85.90 5.61 3.17 8.78 2.00 3.33 5.32
1980 74.58 11.96 86.53 5.39 3.17 8.56 1.95 2.95 4.90
1981 76.17 11.26 87.43 5.34 2.88 8.22 1.80 2.56 4.36
1982 75.13 11.06 86.19 5.29 2.94 8.23 1.85 3.74 5.59
1983 76.29 10.51 86.80 4.95 2.80 7.75 1.79 3.66 5.45
1984 75.52 11.18 86.70 5.01 2.82 7.83 1.93 3.54 5.47
1985 76.07 10.99 87.06 5.28 2.77 8.04 1.71 3.18 4.90
1986 77.06 11.05 88.12 5.01 2.65 7.66 1.54 2.68 4.22
1987 77.98 10.62 88.60 4.92 2.62 7.54 1.43 2.43 3.86
1988 75.70 11.62 87.32 5.65 2.98 8.62 1.60 2.45 4.05
1989 76.07 11.63 87.70 5.25 3.03 8.28 1.64 2.38 4.02
1990 76.14 11.87 88.01 5.32 2.86 8.18 1.52 2.28 3.81
1991 76.35 11.68 88.03 5.17 2.86 8.03 1.57 2.37 3.94
1992 77.35 10.77 88.12 5.04 2.80 7.85 1.60 2.44 4.04
1993 77.51 10.59 88.10 5.15 2.66 7.82 1.55 2.54 4.09
1994 76.92 11.29 88.20 5.24 2.57 7.82 1.48 2.50 3.98
1995 77.08 11.32 88.40 5.10 2.47 7.57 1.47 2.55 4.03
1996 76.27 11.48 87.74 5.26 2.59 7.85 1.60 2.81 4.40
1997 76.79 11.29 88.08 5.17 2.63 7.80 1.53 2.59 4.12
1998 78.06 11.20 89.26 4.75 2.55 7.30 1.38 2.06 3.44
1999 80.27 10.93 91.20 4.13 2.10 6.23 1.12 1.45 2.57
2000 82.41 9.86 92.26 3.88 1.88 5.76 0.97 1.01 1.98
2001 83.98 9.55 93.53 3.35 1.57 4.92 0.84 0.71 1.55
2002 86.54 8.22 94.75 2.76 1.30 4.06 0.70 0.48 1.19
2003 86.30 7.84 94.14 2.87 1.47 4.34 0.83 0.69 1.52
2004 83.34 8.89 92.23 3.61 1.87 5.48 1.10 1.19 2.29
2005 85.27 7.56 92.83 3.26 1.68 4.95 1.01 1.21 2.22
2006 81.48 9.92 91.40 3.85 2.09 5.94 1.22 1.44 2.66
2007 81.88 9.83 91.71 3.64 2.11 5.76 1.22 1.32 2.53
2008 81.84 10.14 91.98 3.72 1.99 5.71 1.14 1.17 2.31
2009 84.34 8.90 93.24 3.51 1.68 5.19 0.88 0.69 1.57
2010 82.64 9.30 91.94 3.99 1.97 5.96 1.13 0.98 2.10
2011 81.27 10.20 91.47 4.19 2.06 6.25 1.17 1.12 2.28
2012 76.55 12.14 88.69 4.82 2.78 7.61 1.68 2.03 3.71
2013 78.99 10.85 89.84 4.56 2.49 7.05 1.50 1.61 3.11
2014 81.82 9.81 91.63 4.05 2.18 6.22 1.16 0.99 2.15
Mean 78.43 10.68 89.11 4.67 2.50 7.17 1.49 2.23 3.71
  Table 2: Concentration of total dividends paid by industrial payers, 1975-2014
Top Payers Middle Payers Bottom Payers
Percent of Total Dividends (% )
Dividend Ranking
This table shows the concentration of aggregate dollar dividends from 1975 to 2014. Firms are ranked by the total dollar
dividends paid in each year in descending order. The sample includes NYSE, NASDAQ, and AMEX firms with share
codes 10 and 11 on CRSP. Firms with SIC codes in the ranges 4900-4949 and 6000-6999 or missing cash dividends,




Figure 2 The yearly average proportion of institutional holdings across groups 
 
  
Fig. 2. The yearly average proportion of institutional holdings across groups, 1980-2014. The institutional holdings are calculated as the ratio
of ownership held by institutional investors to the firm's total number of shares outstanding. The solid line depicts the trend of institutional
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Table 3 Regressions with overall institutional holdings variables on full sample 
 
  
(1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3)
Intercept 0.0131*** 0.0159*** 0.0151*** 0.0145*** 0.0165*** 0.0157*** 0.0185*** 0.0231*** 0.0215***
(3.78) (4.13) (3.92) (5.03) (4.96) (4.77) (3.3) (3.73) (3.48)
DDIVY 0.0903*** 0.0885*** 0.1275*** 0.0895*** 0.0883*** 0.1306*** 0.1179*** 0.1146*** 0.1582***
(3.78) (3.69) (4.57) (3.58) (3.52) (4.76) (3.88) (3.77) (5.17)
INST -0.0093*** -0.0084*** -0.0088*** -0.0077*** -0.0068*** -0.0070*** -0.0206*** -0.0200*** -0.0209***
(-3.65) (-3.28) (-3.18) (-3.38) (-2.99) (-2.81) (-4.82) (-4.63) (-4.52)
Dummy_TOP 0.0031* 0.0022 0.0051*
(1.74) (1.36) (1.8)
Dummy_MID -0.0007 -0.0010 0.0012
(-0.54) (-0.89) (0.58)
DDIVY_TOP -0.0783* -0.0851* -0.0806
(-1.69) (-1.82) (-1.04)
INST_TOP 0.0045* 0.0034 0.0062
(1.83) (1.47) (1.56)
DDIVY_MID -0.0807** -0.0881** -0.0940
(-1.97) (-2.01) (-1.61)
INST_MID -0.0004 -0.0007 0.0015
(-0.19) (-0.37) (0.44)
SIZE -0.0008*** -0.0014*** -0.0013*** -0.0008*** -0.0012*** -0.0011*** -0.0005 -0.0014* -0.0011
(-2.95) (-3.02) (-3.12) (-3.07) (-2.82) (-2.94) (-0.98) (-1.92) (-1.6)
RE -0.0075*** -0.0077*** -0.0076*** -0.0067*** -0.0069*** -0.0068*** -0.0043 -0.0046 -0.0044
(-3.94) (-4.03) (-4.06) (-3.92) (-3.98) (-4.05) (-1.4) (-1.51) (-1.45)
ROA 0.0095 0.0094 0.0102 0.0088 0.0089 0.0096 -0.0019 -0.0027 -0.0014
(1.23) (1.23) (1.32) (1.29) (1.31) (1.4) (-0.15) (-0.21) (-0.11)
MB ratio 0.0002 0.0001 0.0002 -0.000004 -0.0001 -0.00004 0.0001 -0.00002 0.00004
(0.62) (0.36) (0.46) (-0.01) (-0.21) (-0.12) (0.2) (-0.03) (0.06)
SGR -0.0048 -0.0041 -0.0041 -0.0091** -0.0087** -0.0086** -0.0120* -0.0108* -0.0110*
(-1.22) (-1.06) (-1.05) (-2.53) (-2.41) (-2.39) (-1.92) (-1.73) (-1.77)
Industry fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Adj R-square 0.0143 0.0148 0.0157 0.0172 0.0177 0.019 0.0168 0.017 0.0172
No. of Obv 10452 10452 10452 10452 10452 10452 10452 10452 10452
Overall P-value <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001
Window (-1, +1) Window (0, +1) Window (-11, +1)
This table shows the results of regressions on the full sample from 1981 to 2013. Estimation is by pooled time-series (Panel A) and by Fama-
MacBeth method (Panel B). Regressions are CARs, the cumulative abnormal return over the window (-1,+1), (0,+1), and (-11, +1), on the change
of dividend yield, institutional holding, and a set of interactions that denote the impact of dividend paying capacity. DDIVY is the increase in dividend
yield of firm j; INST is the a ratio of instituional holding to the total shares ourstanding of firm j at the end of the quarter before dividend increase is
annouced; Dummy_TOP is a dummy variable, which equals 1 if the firm is top payers when the dividend increase announcement made, 0 otherwise; 
Dummy_MID equals 1 if the firm is middle payer, 0 otherwise; DDIVY_TOP and INST_TOP are interactions calculated as DDIVY and INST
multiplied by Dummy_top respectively; DDIVY_MID and INST_MID are Dummy_mid multiplied by DDIVY and INST. The control variables
include SIZE (the natural logrithm of total sales of firm j), ROA (the ratio of EBITDA to total asset of firm j), RE (the ratio of retained earnings to
total asset of firm j), MB ratio (firm j's mark value of equity divided by its book value of equity), and SGR (the average of growth rate in sales over
the most recent 3 years preceding the dividend increase announcement). Additionally, all regressions control for year and industry fixed effects. We
use two-digit SIC to define industries (following Lo and Wang (2001)). ***, ** and * denote statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels,
respectively.
Table 3 : Regressions on Full Sample





(1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3)
Intercept 0.0129** 0.0145*** 0.0183*** 0.0139*** 0.0157*** 0.0179*** 0.0123** 0.0076 0.0030
(2.73) (2.74) (3.32) (3.10) (3.17) (3.54) (2.37) (1.049) (0.39)
DDIVY 1.1004*** 1.0282*** 0.6726** 1.1970*** 1.1780*** 1.1411*** 2.9616*** 2.9808*** 5.2447***
(5.55) (5.05) (2.48) (7.49) (7.17) (8.55) (9.25) (9.54) (11.07)
INST -0.0059* -0.0049 -0.0046 -0.0032 -0.0026 -0.0024 -0.0202*** -0.0203*** -0.0175***
(-1.93) (-1.44) (-1.21) (-1.05) (-0.80) (-0.77) (-3.97) (-4.18) (-3.20)
DUMMY_TOP 0.0006 0.0002 -0.0030
(0.29) (0.10) (-0.70)
DUMMY_MID -0.0028* -0.0020 -0.0003
(-1.80) (-1.52) (-0.10)
DDIVY_TOP -2.3495*** -1.2411*** -9.8432***
(-2.87) (-3.01) (-4.72)
INST_TOP 0.0042 0.0047 0.0009
(1.22) (1.22) (0.21)
DDIVY_MID -1.1676*** -0.7570 0.7366
(-3.52) (-1.29) (0.61)
INST_MID -0.0038 -0.0026 -0.0040
(-1.48) (-1.48) (-0.82)
SIZE -0.0006* -0.0009* -0.0011** -0.0008** -0.0009 -0.0010** 0.0004 0.0008 0.0010
(-1.86) (-1.78) (-2.59) (-2.14) (-1.68) (-2.14) (0.75) (0.71) (1.03)
RE -0.0047** -0.0049** -0.0050*** -0.0041** -0.0040** -0.0041** -0.0017 -0.0008 -0.0007
(-2.70) (-2.65) (-2.76) (-2.28) (-2.27) (-2.33) (-0.47) (-0.21) (-0.17)
ROA 0.0072 0.0069 0.0074 -0.0004 -0.0002 0.0013 -0.0008 -0.0042 -0.0051
(0.10) (0.96) (1.05) (-0.06) (-0.02) (0.17) (-0.05) (-0.25) (-0.30)
MB ratio 0.0011** 0.0008 0.0009* 0.0014*** 0.0011* 0.0012** -0.0015* -0.0018** -0.0017**
(2.13) (1.59) (1.73) (2.75) (1.99) (2.06) (-2.03) (-2.49) (-2.34)
SGR -0.0307*** -0.0307*** -0.0315*** -0.0362*** -0.0364*** -0.0365*** -0.0323*** -0.0331*** -0.0356***
(-3.43) (-3.50) (-3.49) (-4.10) (-4.13) (-4.16) (-3.95) (-4.24) (-4.21)
Industry fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Adj R-square 0.0288 0.0286 0.0286 0.0384 0.0393 0.0392 0.0256 0.0268 0.0300
No. of Obv 10452 10452 10452 10452 10452 10452 10452 10452 10452
Window (-1, +1) Window (0, +1) Window (-11, +1)
Table 3 (continued)
Panel B: Fama-MacBeth Regressions
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Table 4 Regressions with overall institutional holdings variables on subsamples 
  
(-1, +1) (0, +1) (-11, +1) (-1, +1) (0, +1) (-11, +1) (-1, +1) (0, +1) (-11, +1)
Intercept 0.0158* 0.0128* 0.0297** 0.0184* 0.0260*** 0.0201 0.0093 0.0094* 0.0234**
(1.94) (1.89) (2.05) (1.93) (2.92) (1.21) (1.58) (1.9) (2.56)
DDIVY 0.0551 0.0500 0.0744 0.0458 0.0404 0.0680 0.1224*** 0.1267*** 0.1571***
(1.4) (1.27) (1.04) (1.49) (1.14) (1.32) (4.29) (4.49) (5.07)
INST 0.0012 0.0008 -0.0184* -0.0049 -0.0021 -0.0213** -0.0119*** -0.0109*** -0.0182***
(0.23) (0.17) (-1.97) (-0.98) (-0.44) (-2.36) (-3.1) (-3.25) (-2.84)
SIZE -0.0007 -0.0003 -0.0008 -0.0013 -0.0022** -0.0006 -0.0013* -0.0007 -0.0023*
(-0.95) (-0.49) (-0.63) (-1.09) (-2.13) (-0.29) (-1.77) (-1.09) (-1.95)
RE -0.0050 -0.0043 -0.0023 -0.0056 -0.0066* -0.0016 -0.0086*** -0.0075*** -0.0051
(-1.55) (-1.5) (-0.45) (-1.36) (-1.72) (-0.22) (-3.11) (-3.07) (-1.17)
ROA -0.0200 -0.0149 -0.0231 -0.0081 0.0015 -0.0351 0.0254** 0.0191* 0.0179
(-1.35) (-1.27) (-0.97) (-0.55) (0.11) (-1.22) (2.23) (1.91) (0.97)
MB ratio 0.0012** 0.0010** 0.0012 0.0001 -0.0003 -0.0006 0.00003 -0.0001 0.0002
(2.24) (2.21) (1.22) (0.16) (-0.55) (-0.46) (0.05) (-0.22) (0.2)
SGR 0.0095 0.0044 -0.0010 0.0025 0.0017 -0.0025 -0.0114** -0.0177*** -0.0166*
(1.42) (0.77) (-0.08) (0.41) (0.31) (-0.25) (-2.06) (-3.47) (-1.79)
Industry fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Adj R-square 0.0096 0.014 0.0274 0.0073 0.0073 0.0169 0.0228 0.0276 0.0163
No. of Obv 2870 2870 2870 2530 2530 2530 5052 5052 5052
Overall P-value 0.0079 0.0004 <.0001 0.0437 0.0433 0.0002 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001
(-1, +1) (0, +1) (-11, +1) (-1, +1) (0, +1) (-11, +1) (-1, +1) (0, +1) (-11, +1)
Intercept 0.0017 0.0074 0.0137 -0.0088 0.0166 0.0211 0.0230** 0.0299** -0.0296**
(0.19) (0.76) (0.51) (-0.48) (1.09) (0.77) (2.18) (2.70) (-2.35)
DDIVY 0.6509 0.1339 -6.1933** 4.6589*** 2.7383*** 4.0466** 0.4703* 1.0667*** 6.1370***
(0.98) (0.38) (-2.63) (4.97) (3.01) (2.40) (1.78) (7.49) (10.34)
INST 0.0167** 0.0076 -0.0143 -0.0008 0.0021 -0.0201** -0.0114** -0.0072 -0.0174*
(2.62) (1.68) (-1.23) (-0.13) (0.30) (-2.33) (-2.30) (-1.55) (-1.79)
SIZE 0.0002 -0.0009 0.0028 0.0017 -0.0017 0.0003 -0.0015 -0.0012 0.0024
(0.19) (-1.03) (0.92) (0.81) (-1.02) (0.091) (-1.60) (-1.20) (1.15)
RE 0.0110 0.0145 0.0156 -0.0080 -0.0092* 0.0117 -0.0109** -0.0088** 0.0049
(1.29) (1.64) (1.36) (-1.23) (-1.82) (0.94) (-2.60) (-2.46) (0.68)
ROA -0.0544** -0.0342** 0.0028 -0.0101 0.0081 -0.0687** 0.0147 -0.0204 0.0115
(-2.51) (-2.11) (0.07) (-0.61) (0.53) (-2.25) (0.92) (-0.96) (0.48)
MB ratio -0.0014** -0.0012 -0.0079*** 0.0015 0.0007 -0.0024 0.0022** 0.0026** 0.0020
(-2.32) (-1.69) (-3.83) (1.26) (0.79) (-1.46) (2.16) (2.68) (1.54)
SGR -0.0142 -0.0099 -0.0086 -0.0097 -0.0034 0.0206 -0.04685*** -0.0507*** -0.0504***
(-0.98) (-0.83) (-0.48) (-0.89) (-0.32) (0.87) (-4.88) (-5.30) (-3.54)
Industry fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Adj R-square 0.0445 0.0561 0.0492 0.0074 -0.0029 0.0081 0.0270 0.0438 0.0240
No. of Obv 2870 2870 2870 2530 2530 2530 5052 5052 5052
Panel B: Fama-MacBeth Regressions
Top Middle Bottom
Top Middle Bottom
Table 4: Regressions on Subsamples
This table shows the results of regressions on the subsamples from 1981 to 2013. Estimation is by pooled time-series (Panel A) and by Fama-
MacBeth method (Panel B). Regressions are CARs, the cumulative abnormal return over the window (-1,+1), (0,+1), and (-11, +1), on the change
of dividend yield, institutional holding, and a set of interactions that denote the impact of dividend paying capacity. DDIVY is the increase in dividend
yield of firm j; INST is the a ratio of instituional holding to the total shares ourstanding of firm j at the end of the quarter before dividend increase is
annouced; The control variables include SIZE (the natural logrithm of total sales of firm j), ROA (the ratio of EBITDA to total asset of firm j), RE
(the ratio of retained earnings to total asset of firm j), MB ratio (firm j's mark value of equity divided by its book value of equity), and SGR (the
average of growth rate in sales over the most recent 3 years preceding the dividend increase announcement). Additionally, all regressions control for
year and industry fixed effects. We use two-digit SIC to define industries (following Lo and Wang (2001)). ***, ** and * denote statistical
significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively.
Panel A: Pooled Regressions
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Fig 3 (a). The yearly average ownership held by motivated monitors (INST_MONITOR ) across groups, 1980-2014. The motivated monitors are defined
as instutions whose holding value of the firm ranks in the 10% of its portfolio allocation. The ownership held by motivated monitors is the shares owned
by all motivated monitors in the firm as a proportion of the firm's total shares outstanding. The solid line dispicts mean INST_MONITOR for top payers,








Top payers Middle payers Bottom payers
Fig 3 (b). The yearly average ownership held by dedicated institutions (INST_DED ) across groups, 1980-2014. The classification of institutional
investors is from Bushee's (1998, 2001) work. The dedicated instiutions are regarded as those who have the incentive to monitor the firm. The solid line
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Fig 3 (c). The yearly average ownership held by quasi-indexers (INST_QIX ) across groups, 1980-2014. The classification of institutional investors is
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Fig 3 (d). The yearly average ownership held by transient institutional investors (INST_TRA ) across groups, 1980-2014. The classification of institutional
investors is from Bushee's (1998, 2001) work. The transient instituions are regarded as those who care little about the firm's governance. The solid line
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Table 5 Regressions with monitoring institutional holding variables on full sample  
  
(1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2)
Intercept 0.0169*** 0.0132*** 0.0178*** 0.0142*** 0.0245*** 0.0154** 0.0145** 0.0126** 0.0162*** 0.0141*** 0.0031 -0.0036
(4.07) (3.22) (4.91) (3.97) (3.72) (2.34) (2.73) (2.56) (3.22) (2.86) (0.41) (-0.51)
DDIVY 0.0894*** 0.0881*** 0.0888*** 0.0879*** 0.1170*** 0.1131*** 1.1778*** 1.1704*** 1.2400*** 1.2034*** 3.3925*** 3.3946***
(3.7) (3.61) (3.52) (3.45) (3.75) (3.6) (5.49) (5.48) (7.05) (6.87) (9.42) (9.76)
NO_MONITOR 0.000002 0.000004 -0.000002 0.00001 -0.00001 -0.00001
(0.35) (1.06) (-0.18) (1.32) (-1.56) (-0.51)
INST_MONITOR -0.0119*** -0.0102*** -0.0325*** -0.0080** -0.0065* -0.0321***
(-3.27) (-3.09) (-5.22) (-2.08) (-1.66) (-4.65)
DUMMY_TOP 0.0033* 0.0051*** 0.0023 0.0039** 0.0056** 0.0106*** 0.0006 0.0015 0.0007 0.0008 -0.0039 0.0010
(1.85) (2.85) (1.46) (2.43) (1.97) (3.57) (0.32) (0.79) (0.33) (0.42) (-0.89) (0.23)
DUMMY_MID -0.0011 -0.0008 -0.0012 -0.0011 0.0001 0.0011 -0.0027* -0.0025* -0.0018 -0.0017 -0.0018 -0.0004
(-0.81) (-0.63) (-1.01) (-0.97) (0.05) (0.55) (-1.80) (-1.77) (-1.33) (-1.31) (-0.58) (-0.12)
SIZE -0.0020*** -0.0013** -0.0017*** -0.0011** -0.0026*** -0.0011 -0.0016** -0.0012* -0.0015** -0.0012** -0.0003 0.0012
(-3.63) (-2.53) (-3.49) (-2.28) (-3.09) (-1.28) (-2.65) (-2.00) (-2.64) (-2.17) (-0.29) (1.02)
RE -0.0078*** -0.0077*** -0.0071*** -0.0068*** -0.0048 -0.0044 -0.0059*** -0.0051*** -0.0048** -0.0040** -0.0018 0.00004
(-4.06) (-3.99) (-4.05) (-3.94) (-1.56) (-1.45) (-3.00) (-2.76) (-2.63) (-2.22) (-0.46) (0.01)
ROA 0.0100 0.0096 0.0094 0.0090 -0.0011 -0.0025 0.0092 0.0085 0.0016 0.0016 0.0024 -0.0031
(1.31) (1.25) (1.38) (1.32) (-0.09) (-0.19) (1.25) (1.19) (0.21) (0.21) (0.14) (-0.18)
MB ratio 0.00005 0.0002 -0.0001 0.000001 -0.0002 0.0002 0.0003 0.0007 0.0007 0.0010* -0.0024*** -0.0018**
(0.14) (0.57) (-0.47) (0) (-0.28) (0.34) (0.67) (1.27) (1.40) (1.82) (-3.11) (-2.39)
SGR -0.0040 -0.0040 -0.0085** -0.0086** -0.0106* -0.0105* -0.0287*** -0.0294*** -0.0351*** -0.0357*** -0.0302*** -0.0314***
(-1.03) (-1.02) (-2.38) (-2.38) (-1.73) (-1.7) (-3.31) (-3.34) (-4.04) (-4.05) (-3.95) (-4.10)
Industry fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Adj R-square 0.0137 0.0146 0.0167 0.0175 0.0146 0.0171 0.0257 0.0270 0.0357 0.0381 0.0248 0.0273
No. of Obv 10452 10452 10452 10452 10452 10452 10452 10452 10452 10452 10452 10452
Overall P-value <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 - - - - - -
Table 5: Regressions with Motivated Monitoring Institutional Variables on Full Sample
Window(-1, +1) Window(0, +1) Window(-11, +1)
Panel A: Pooled Regressions
Window(-1, +1) Window(0, +1) Window(-11, +1)
This table shows the results of regressions on the full sample with motivated monitoring institutional variables from 1981 to 2013. Estimation is by pooled time-series (Panel A) and by Fama-
MacBeth method (Panel B). Regressions are CARs, the cumulative abnormal return over the window (-1,+1), (0,+1), and (-11, +1), on the change of dividend yield, institutional holding, and
institutional investor monitoring variables. DDIVY is the increase in dividend yield of firm j; INST is the a ratio of instituional holding to the total shares ourstanding of firm j at the end of the
quarter before dividend increase is annouced;NO_MONITOR is the number of institutions whose holding value of firm j is in the top 10% of the institution's portfolio; INST_MONITOR is the
ownership of monitoring institutions as a proportion of the total shares outstanding of firm j; Dummy_TOP is a dummy variable, which equals 1 if the firm is top payers when the dividend
increase announcement made, 0 otherwise; Dummy_MID equals 1 if the firm is middle payer, 0 otherwise. The control variables include SIZE (the natural logrithm of total sales of firm j), ROA
(the ratio of EBITDA to total asset of firm j), RE (the ratio of retained earnings to total asset of firm j), MB ratio (firm j's mark value of equity divided by its book value of equity), and SGR (the
average of growth rate in sales over the most recent 3 years preceding the dividend increase announcement). Additionally, all regressions control for year and industry fixed effects. We use two-
digit SIC to define industries (following Lo and Wang (2001)). ***, ** and * denote statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively.
Panel B: Fama-MacBeth Regressions
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Table 6 Regressions with monitoring institutional holding variables on subsamples  
  
(1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2)
INTERCEPT 0.0051 0.0121 0.0077 0.0101 -0.0109 0.0030 0.0086 0.0139 0.0194** 0.0234** -0.0137 0.0038 0.0104* 0.0103* 0.0107** 0.0100* 0.0221** 0.0206**
(0.55) (1.56) (1.01) (1.55) (-0.67) (0.22) (0.80) (1.36) (1.96) (2.48) (-0.74) (0.22) (1.69) (1.69) (2.05) (1.95) (2.32) (2.22)
DDIVY 0.0555 0.0505 0.0503 0.0468 0.0770 0.0618 0.0461 0.0455 0.0404 0.0400 0.0698 0.0.0673 0.1236*** 0.1241*** 0.1277*** 0.1283*** 0.1590*** 0.1607***
(1.45) (1.33) (1.29) (1.21) (1.09) (0.89) (1.51) (1.48) (1.15) (1.13) (1.38) (1.3) (4.37) (4.35) (4.55) (4.54) (5.12) (5.23)
NO_MONITOR -0.00002** -0.00001 -0.00004*** -0.0001** -0.0001 -0.0005*** -0.0004* -0.0003* -0.0010***
(-2.48) (-1.42) (-3.36) (-2.09) (-1.6) (-4.06) (-1.95) (-1.8) (-2.88)
INST_MONITOR -0.0119** -0.0085* -0.0368*** -0.0085 -0.0052 -0.0302** -0.0212** -0.0215*** -0.0600***
(-2.22) (-1.78) (-3.84) (-1.21) (-0.80) (-2.51) (-2.57) (-2.9) (-4.44)
SIZE 0.0009 0.0001 0.0004 0.0003 0.0034** 0.0022 -0.0002 -0.0008 -0.0014 -0.0019 0.0030 0.0009 -0.0020*** -0.0019** -0.0014** -0.0012* -0.0028** -0.0023**
(0.86) (0.17) (0.49) (0.38) (1.96) (1.59) (-0.13) (-0.61) (-1.18) (-1.62) (1.29) (0.39) (-2.6) (-2.5) (-1.99) (-1.72) (-2.36) (-1.99)
RE -0.0039 -0.0052 -0.0037 -0.0044 0.0014 -0.0020 -0.0047 -0.0051 -0.0060 -0.0063 0.0018 0.0005 -0.0090*** -0.0091*** -0.0079*** -0.0079*** -0.0054 -0.0054
(-1.16) (-1.6) (-1.27) (-1.54) (0.28) (-0.39) (-1.13) (-1.21) (-1.55) (-1.62) (0.24) (0.07) (-3.24) (-3.27) (-3.22) (-3.23) (-1.24) (-1.25)
ROA -0.0172 -0.0209 -0.0137 -0.0155 -0.0101 -0.0193 -0.0061 -0.0078 0.0028 0.0016 -0.0282 -0.0340 0.0270** 0.0262** 0.0205** 0.0198** 0.0206 0.0184
(-1.17) (-1.42) (-1.17) (-1.34) (-0.41) (-0.81) (-0.42) (-0.53) (0.2) (0.12) (-0.99) (-1.19) (2.38) (2.31) (2.06) (1.99) (1.12) (1)
MB ratio 0.0013** 0.0013** 0.0010** 0.0011** 0.0015 0.0016* 0.0003 0.0002 -0.0002 -0.0003 -0.00002 -0.0003 -0.00003 0.00001 -0.0002 -0.0001 0.0003 0.0005
(2.52) (2.51) (2.37) (2.41) (1.58) (1.65) (0.4) (0.28) (-0.35) (-0.45) (-0.02) (-0.24) (-0.04) (0.02) (-0.34) (-0.21) (0.27) (0.43)
SGR 0.0095 0.0096 0.0044 0.0044 0.00001 0.0002 0.0036 0.0027 0.0024 0.0018 0.0015 -0.0017 -0.0104* -0.0107* -0.0168*** -0.0171*** -0.0148 -0.0155*
(1.41) (1.4) (0.77) (0.77) (0) (0.02) (0.6) (0.44) (0.46) (0.33) (0.16) (-0.17) (-1.89) (-1.94) (-3.32) (-3.35) (-1.63) (-1.7)
Industry fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Adj R-square 0.0115 0.0115 0.0146 0.0153 0.0294 0.0316 0.0086 0.0076 0.0082 0.0075 0.0207 0.0171 0.0216 0.0221 0.0262 0.0271 0.0162 0.0181
No. of Obv 2870 2870 2870 2870 2870 2870 2530 2530 2530 2530 2530 2530 5052 5052 5052 5052 5052 5052
Overall P-value 0.0024 0.0024 0.0003 0.0002 <.0001 <.0001 0.0240 0.0385 0.0286 0.0392 <.0001 0.0002 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001
This table shows the results of pooled time-series and Fama-MacBeth regressions on the subsamples with motivated monitoring variables from 1981 to 2013. The whole sample is divided into three subsamples: top
payers, middle payers, and bottom payers, by cash dividends paid in certain year. Firms are defined as top or middle payers if they rank in top 200 or 201-400 in year i, otherwise are defined as bottom payers.
Regressions are CARs, the cumulative abnormal return over the window (-1,+1), (0,+1), and (-11, +1), on the change of dividend yield, institutional holding, and institutional investor monitoring variables. DDIVY is
the increase in dividend yield of firm j; INST is the a ratio of instituional holding to the total shares ourstanding of firm j at the end of the quarter before dividend increase is annouced;NO_MONITOR is the number 
of institutions whose holding value of firm j is in the top 10% of the institution's portfolio; INST_MONITOR is the ownership of monitoring institutions as a proportion of the total shares outstanding of firm j; The
control variables include SIZE (the natural logrithm of total sales of firm j), ROA (the ratio of EBITDA to total asset of firm j), RE (the ratio of retained earnings to total asset of firm j), MB ratio (firm j's mark
value of equity divided by its book value of equity), and SGR (the average of growth rate in sales over the most recent 3 years preceding the dividend increase announcement). Additionally, all regressions control
for year and industry fixed effects. We use two-digit SIC to define industries (following Lo and Wang (2001)). ***, ** and * denote statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively.
Table 6: Regressions with Motivated Monitoring Institutional Variables on subsample
Bottom Payers
Window (-1, +1) Window (0, +1) Window (-11, +1)
Panel A: Pooled Regressions
Middle Payers








(1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2)
Intercept 0.0101 0.0102 0.0047 -0.0030 -0.0259 -0.0329 -0.0348 -0.0116 -0.0009 0.0135 -0.0303 0.0116 0.0233** 0.0215* 0.0291** 0.0286** -0.0515*** -0.0447***
(0.99) (1.20) (0.39) (-0.30) (-0.87) (-1.10) (-1.66) (-0.60) (-0.06) (0.89) (-1.12) (0.39) (2.14) (1.84) (2.62) (2.42) (-3.55) (-3.15)
DDIVY -0.3317 -1.5549** 0.3362 -0.5964 -4.5063* -6.9132*** 2.6386*** 3.4615*** 0.2211 1.0648 3.1948 4.0808** 0.8291*** 0.8306*** 1.2425*** 1.2819*** 6.3719*** 6.4988***
(-0.44) (-2.08) (0.87) (-1.11) (-1.78) (-2.85) (3.48) (-0.73) (0.23) (1.25) (1.65) (2.25) (3.02) (3.16) (9.36) (9.17) (10.03) (9.22)
NO_MONITOR 0.00005*** 0.00003* -0.0001*** -0.0008*** -0.0005*** -0.0014*** 0.0004 0.0006 -0.0025**
(3.16) (1.95) (-3.29) (-6.79) (-3.57) (-8.70) (0.48) (1.04) (-2.34)
INST_MONITOR -0.0141** -0.0114* -0.0436*** -0.0058 -0.0012 -0.0316** 0.0305* 0.0360** -0.0515*
(-2.20) (-1.89) (-3.51) (-0.73) (-0.15) (-2.21) (1.97) (2.21) (-1.78)
SIZE -0.0005 0.0002 -0.0012 0.00001 0.0055 0.0056 0.0052** 0.0023 0.0011 -0.0010 0.0058* 0.0004 -0.0027** -0.0026** -0.0026** -0.0022** 0.0024 0.0021
(-0.38) (0.26) (-0.90) (0.01) (1.45) (1.67) (2.13) (0.97) (0.59) (-0.56) (1.81) (0.12) (-2.50) (-2.29) (-2.60) (-2.18) (1.34) (1.16)
RE 0.0155 0.0120 0.0186* 0.0161* 0.0287** 0.0252** -0.0049 -0.0120 -0.0082* -0.0102* 0.0186 0.0070 -0.0105** -0.0103** -0.0091** -0.0089** 0.0072 0.0071
(1.63) (1.35) (2.02) (1.79) (2.35) (2.18) (-0.72) (-1.65) (-1.78) (-2.01) (1.64) (0.51) (-2.56) (-2.35) (-2.48) (-2.42) (1.01) (0.95)
ROA -0.0493** -0.0607*** -0.0305* -0.0323** -0.0157 0.0040 -0.0133 -0.0083 0.0108 0.0081 -0.0624** -0.0638** 0.0174 0.0089 -0.0139 -0.0218 0.0267 0.0237
(-2.09) (-2.99) (-1.75) (-2.13) (-0.35) (0.10) (-0.77) (-0.49) (0.73) (0.53) (-2.09) (-2.07) (1.00) (0.52) (-0.65) (-1.01) (1.13) (0.97)
MB ratio -0.0027*** -0.0011 -0.0021** -0.0009 -0.0067*** -0.0066*** 0.0032** 0.0017 0.0010 0.0009 -0.0002 -0.0023 0.0018 0.0027** 0.0019* 0.0022** 0.0012 0.0010
(-3.64) (-1.63) (-2.55) (-1.21) (-3.16) (-2.98) (2.45) (1.45) (1.19) (1.03) (-0.14) (-1.39) (1.55) (2.04) (1.84) (2.18) (0.89) (0.81)
SGR -0.0148 -0.0177 -0.0102 -0.0136 -0.0061 -0.0069 0.0007 -0.0095 0.0037 -0.0044 0.0248 0.0164 -0.0446*** -0.0445*** -0.052*** -0.0500*** -0.0383*** -0.0408***
(-1.04) (-1.26) (-0.83) (-1.14) (-0.32) (-0.38) (0.07) (-0.83) (0.34) (-0.40) (1.11) (0.65) (-4.85) (-4.87) (-5.60) (-5.45) (-2.89) (-3.12)
Industry fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Adj R-square 0.0453 0.0468 0.0570 0.0590 0.0518 0.0554 0.0105 0.0032 -0.0057 -0.0082 0.0083 0.0080 0.0266 0.0272 0.0443 0.0450 0.0236 0.0245
No. of Obv 2870 2870 2870 2870 2870 2870 2530 2530 2530 2530 2530 2530 5052 5052 5052 5052 5052 5052
Panel B: Fama-MacBeth Regressions
Table 6 (continued) 
Middle Payers
Window (-1, +1) Window (0, +1) Window (-11, +1)
Bottom Payers
Window (-1, +1) Window (0, +1) Window (-11, +1)
Top Payers
Window (-1, +1) Window (0, +1) Window (-11, +1)
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Table 7 Regressions with Bushee classification institutional variables on full sample  
  
(1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2)
Intercept 0.0138*** 0.0154*** 0.0164*** 0.0163*** 0.0177** 0.0210*** 0.0117** 0.0146*** 0.0157*** 0.0161*** -0.0051 0.0042
(3.16) (3.98) (4.26) (4.89) (2.54) (3.38) (2.04) (2.78) (2.86) (3.24) (-0.72) (0.52)
DDIVY 0.0877*** 0.0880*** 0.0878*** 0.0880*** 0.1138*** 0.1133*** 1.1889*** 1.0136*** 1.2455*** 1.1680*** 3.0461*** 2.9767***
(3.64) (3.67) (3.49) (3.51) (3.64) (3.75) (5.51) (5.04) (7.08) (7.12) (8.55) (9.29)
NO_INST_DED 0.0001 0.0002* -0.0004* 0.0001 -0.00004 0.0002
(1.05) (1.83) (-1.83) (0.47) (-0.13) (0.34)
NO_INST_QIX 0.00001* 0.00001 0.0001*** -0.00003* -0.000004 0.0002***
(1.82) (1.2) (4.71) (-1.95) (-0.33) (5.95)
NO_INST_TRA -0.00007*** -0.00003 -0.0002*** -0.0002*** -0.0001** -0.0011***
(-2.69) (-1.6) (-5.13) (-3.48) (-2.35) (-6.38)
INST_DED -0.0052 -0.0069 -0.0102 -0.0061 -0.0167** -0.0113
(-1.03) (-1.55) (-1.19) (-1.02) (-2.57) (-1.45)
INST_QIX -0.0074** -0.0060* -0.0085 -0.0053 -0.0021 -0.0003
(-2.04) (-1.85) (-1.45) (-1.43) (-0.57) (-0.03)
INST_TRA -0.0151* -0.0109 -0.0637*** -0.0157* -0.0026 -0.1104***
(-1.92) (-1.53) (-4.83) (-2.03) (-0.36) (-4.21)
DUMMY_TOP 0.0030* 0.0028 0.0017 0.0020 0.0068** 0.0037 0.0015 0.0003 0.0011 0.0004 -0.0033 -0.0058
(1.72) (1.59) (1.04) (1.27) (2.31) (1.28) (0.80) (0.17) (0.55) (0.19) (-0.73) (-1.31)
DUMMY_MID -0.0012 -0.0007 -0.0014 -0.0010 0.0011 0.0010 -0.0027* -0.0029* -0.0021 -0.0020 0.0001 -0.0015
(-0.91) (-0.57) (-1.26) (-0.89) (0.5) (0.49) (-1.94) (-1.88) (-1.63) (-1.56) (0.03) (-0.49)
SIZE -0.0016*** -0.0014*** -0.0017*** -0.0012*** -0.0015 -0.0014* -0.0010 -0.0009* -0.0014** -0.0010* 0.0014 0.0008
(-2.71) (-2.96) (-3.04) (-2.79) (-1.54) (-1.82) (-1.51) (-1.87) (-2.23) (-1.86) (1.26) (0.66)
RE -0.0083*** -0.0080*** -0.0074*** -0.0071*** -0.0068** -0.0070** -0.0062*** -0.0063*** -0.0047** -0.0044** -0.0098** -0.0078*
(-4.21) (-4.16) (-4.13) (-4.05) (-2.15) (-2.26) (-2.76) (-3.23) (-2.39) (-2.35) (-2.58) (-1.90)
ROA 0.0117 0.0103 0.0101 0.0093 0.0059 0.0024 0.0112 0.0092 0.0015 -0.0008 0.0159 0.0061
(1.52) (1.35) (1.47) (1.36) (0.45) (0.19) (1.44) (1.28) (0.18) (-0.10) (0.99) (0.36)
MB ratio 0.00005 0.0001 -0.0002 -0.0001 -0.0002 -0.00001 0.0007 0.0007 0.0011* 0.0010* -0.0017** -0.0019**
(0.14) (0.36) (-0.51) (-0.21) (-0.4) (-0.02) (1.31) (1.45) (1.85) (1.90) (-2.08) (-2.48)
SGR -0.0033 -0.0039 -0.0080** -0.0085** -0.0085 -0.0088 -0.0230*** -0.0300*** -0.0309*** -0.0364*** -0.0230*** -0.0271***
(-0.84) (-0.99) (-2.25) (-2.32) (-1.4) (-1.43) (-3.10) (-3.64) (-4.04) (-4.34) (-3.40) (-3.83)
Industry fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Adj R-square 0.0144 0.0148 0.0171 0.0176 0.0166 0.0186 0.0244 0.0261 0.0356 0.0370 0.0307 0.0304
No. of Obv 10452 10452 10452 10452 10452 10452 10452 10452 10452 10452 10452 10452
Overall P-value <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 - - - - - -
Table 7:Regressions with Bushee Classification on Full Sample
Window(-1, +1) Window(0, +1) Window(-11, +1)
This table shows the results of pooled time-series and Fama-Macbeth regressions on the full sample with monitor variables from 1981 to 2013. Regressions are CARs, the cumulative abnormal return over the
window (-1,+1), (0,+1), and (-11, +1), on the change of dividend yield, institutional holding, and institutional investor monitoring variables. DDIVY is the increase in dividend yield of firm j; INST is the a ratio of
instituional holding to the total shares ourstanding of firm j at the end of the quarter before dividend increase is annouced; NO_DED is the number of dedicated institutions who hold value of firm j; INST_DED is
the quarterly ownership held by dedicated instituions as a proportion of the total shares outstanding of firm j; NO_QIX is the number of quasi-indexer institutions who hold value of firm j; INST_QIX is the
quarterly ownership held by quasi-indexer as a proportion of the total shares outstanding of firm j; NO_TRA is the number of transient institutions who hold value of firm j; INST_TRA is the quarterly ownership
held by transient institutions as a proportion of the total shares outstanding of firm j; Dummy_TOP is a dummy variable, which equals 1 if the firm is top payers when the dividend increase announcement made, 0
otherwise; Dummy_MID equals 1 if the firm is middle payer, 0 otherwise. The control variables include SIZE (the natural logrithm of total sales of firm j), ROA (the ratio of EBITDA to total asset of firm j), RE
(the ratio of retained earnings to total asset of firm j), MB ratio (firm j's mark value of equity divided by its book value of equity), and SGR (the average of growth rate in sales over the most recent 3 years
preceding the dividend increase announcement). Additionally, all regressions control for year and industry fixed effects. We use two-digit SIC to define industries (following Lo and Wang (2001)). ***, ** and *
denote statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively.
Panel A: Pooled regressions Panel B: Fama-MacBeth regressions
Window(-1, +1) Window(0, +1) Window(-11, +1)
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Table 8 Regressions with Bushee classification institutional variables on subsamples 
  
(1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2)
Intercept 0.0057 0.0160** 0.0095 0.0135** -0.0035 0.0301** 0.0024 0.0197** 0.0171* 0.0280*** -0.0231 0.0171 0.0059 0.0075 0.0093 0.0084* 0.0196* 0.0192**
(0.59) (1.97) (1.19) (1.97) (-0.2) (2.09) (0.22) (2.00) (1.71) (3.07) (-1.25) (1.02) (0.9) (1.26) (1.63) (1.68) (1.86) (2.06)
DDIVY 0.0505 0.0573 0.0481 0.0515 0.0672 0.0771 0.0414 0.0453 0.0374 0.0390 0.0589 0.0671 0.1227*** 0.1214*** 0.1273*** 0.1261*** 0.1588*** 0.1547***
(1.34) (1.38) (1.24) (1.26) (0.96) (1.02) (1.38) (1.49) (1.08) (1.11) (1.17) (1.27) (4.35) (4.25) (4.53) (4.48) (4.99) (5.10)
NO_INST_DED 0.0001 0.0001 -0.0001 0.0001 0.0002 -0.0002 -0.0007 -0.0005 -0.0022***
(0.62) (0.44) (-0.5) (0.4) (0.75) (-0.27) (-1.54) (-1.33) (-3.09)
NO_INST_QIX 0.000003 0.000002 0.00002* -0.00004* -0.00004** -0.00002 -0.00002 0.00002 0.0002**
(0.43) (0.37) (1.78) (-1.88) (-2.13) (-0.67) (-0.38) (0.38) (2.07)
NO_INST_TRA -0.0001* -0.00003 -0.0002*** -0.00003 0.00002 -0.0003*** -0.00009 -0.0001 -0.0004***
(-1.94) (-1.04) (-3.19) (-0.56) (0.37) (-2.91) (-0.93) (-1.04) (-2.94)
INST_DED -0.0140 -0.0116 -0.0437** -0.0041 0.0025 -0.0108 0.0019 -0.0058 0.0080
(-1.47) (-1.42) (-2.31) (-0.38) (0.25) (-0.58) (0.28) (-0.99) (0.69)
INST_QIX 0.0095 0.0056 0.0003 -0.0096 -0.0100 -0.0159 -0.0115** -0.0077 -0.0080
(1.37) (0.94) (0.02) (-1.46) (-1.63) (-1.41) (-2.13) (-1.62) (-0.92)
INST_TRA -0.0157 -0.0103 -0.0675*** 0.0086 0.0171 -0.0429* -0.0248** -0.0254** -0.0723***
(-1.09) (-0.81) (-2.85) (0.58) (1.26) (-1.69) (-2.15) (-2.43) (-3.77)
SIZE 0.0005 -0.0008 0.00003 -0.0004 0.0024 -0.0012 0.0007 -0.0014 -0.0011 -0.0024** 0.0046* -0.0004 -0.0010 -0.0012 -0.0010 -0.0007 -0.0019 -0.0020*
(0.45) (-1.2) (0.03) (-0.71) (1.25) (-1.01) (0.54) (-1.17) (-0.91) (-2.23) (1.94) (-0.19) (-1.05) (-1.59) (-1.2) (-0.99) (-1.28) (-1.66)
RE -0.0052 -0.0061* -0.0045 -0.0050* -0.0032 -0.0051 -0.0033 -0.0043 -0.0044 -0.0045 0.0003 -0.0033 -0.0086*** -0.0090*** -0.0081*** -0.0081*** -0.0073 -0.0073*
(-1.49) (-1.83) (-1.48) (-1.72) (-0.59) (-0.99) (-0.78) (-1.06) (-1.11) (-1.21) (0.04) (-0.44) (-3.00) (-3.21) (-3.19) (-3.25) (-1.61) (-1.65)
ROA -0.0165 -0.0195 -0.0135 -0.0149 -0.0068 -0.0219 -0.0057 -0.0111 0.0005 -0.0027 -0.0178 -0.0288 0.0275** 0.0276** 0.0213** 0.0205** 0.0251 0.0241
(-1.11) (-1.33) (-1.15) (-1.28) (-0.28) (-0.91) (-0.37) (-0.79) (0.03) (-0.19) (-0.6) (-1.03) (2.41) (2.42) (2.13) (2.05) (1.36) (1.3)
MB ratio 0.0012** 0.0012** 0.0010** 0.0010** 0.0013 0.0012 0.0004 0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0003 -0.0001 -0.0006 0.0002 0.0001 -0.0002 -0.0001 0.0003 0.0004
(2.35) (2.28) (2.22) (2.24) (1.32) (1.25) (0.62) (0.18) (-0.14) (-0.54) (-0.11) (-0.52) (0.31) (0.17) (-0.25) (-0.14) (0.24) (0.38)
SGR 0.0110 0.0109* 0.0051 0.0052 0.0038 0.0026 0.0028 0.0019 0.0016 0.0005 -0.0002 -0.0023 -0.0108** -0.0115** -0.0169*** -0.0172*** -0.0141 -0.0152*
(1.64) (1.65) (0.9) (0.93) (0.31) (0.22) (0.47) (0.30) (0.3) (0.08) (-0.02) (-0.23) (-1.96) (-2.07) (-3.35) (-3.36) (-1.59) (-1.72)
Industry fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Adj R-square 0.0111 0.0108 0.0138 0.0145 0.0289 0.0301 0.0098 0.0072 0.0087 0.0085 0.0213 0.0166 0.0221 0.0233 0.026 0.0278 0.0176 0.0187
No. of Obv 2870 2870 2870 2870 2870 2870 2530 2530 2530 2530 2530 2530 5052 5052 5052 5052 5052 5052
Overall P-value 0.0035 0.0043 0.0006 0.0004 <.0001 <.0001 0.0149 0.0489 0.0252 0.0266 <.0001 0.0003 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001
Table 8: Regressions with Bushee Classification Variables on Subsamples
Top payers
Window(-1, +1) Window(0, +1) Window(-11, +1)
This table shows the results of pooled time-series and Fama-MacBeth regressions on the subsample with monitor variables from 1981 to 2013. The whole sample is divided into three subsamples: top payers, middle payers, and bottom payers, by
cash dividends paid in certain year. Firms are defined as top or middle payers if they rank in top 200 or 201-400 in year i, otherwise are defined as bottom payers. Regressions are CARs, the cumulative abnormal return over the window (-1,+1),
(0,+1), and (-11, +1), on the change of dividend yield, institutional holding, and institutional investor monitoring variables. DDIVY is the increase in dividend yield of firm j; INST is the a ratio of instituional holding to the total shares ourstanding
of firm j at the end of the quarter before dividend increase is annouced; NO_DED is the number of dedicated institutions who hold value of firm j; INST_DED is the quarterly ownership held by dedicated instituions as a proportion of the total
shares outstanding of firm j; NO_QIX is the number of quasi-indexer institutions who hold value of firm j; INST_QIX is the quarterly ownership held by quasi-indexer as a proportion of the total shares outstanding of firm j; NO_TRA is the
number of transient institutions who hold value of firm j; INST_TRA is the quarterly ownership held by transient institutions as a proportion of the total shares outstanding of firm j; The control variables include SIZE (the natural logrithm of total 
sales of firm j), ROA (the ratio of EBITDA to total asset of firm j), RE (the ratio of retained earnings to total asset of firm j), MB ratio (firm j's mark value of equity divided by its book value of equity), and SGR (the average of growth rate in sales
over the most recent 3 years preceding the dividend increase announcement). Additionally, all regressions control for year and industry fixed effects. We use two-digit SIC to define industries (following Lo and Wang (2001)). ***, ** and *
denote statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively.
Panel A: Pooled Regressions
Middle payers
Window(-1, +1) Window(0, +1) Window(-11, +1)
Bottome payers





(1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2)
Intercept 0.0035 -0.0128 -0.0160 0.0011 -0.0368 -0.0002 -0.0184 -0.0083 0.0068 0.0250 -0.0311 0.0161 0.0199 0.0235** 0.0260** 0.0262** -0.0391*** -0.0284**
(0.30) (-1.25) (-1.14) (0.12) (-1.15) (-0.01) (-1.09) (-0.44) (0.46) (1.58) (-1.08) (0.57) (1.53) (2.21) (2.08) (2.42) (-3.16) (-2.28)
DDIVY 0.8668 1.0361 1.1404*** 0.6062 -5.6493** -5.3769** 3.2820*** 5.2360*** 1.5363** 2.7865*** 4.5843** 3.8040** 0.6148** 0.6020** 1.0932*** 1.0630*** 6.2435*** 6.3152***
(1.21) (1.40) (2.99) (1.67) (-2.29) (-2.27) (5.21) (4.88) (2.04) (3.18) (2.30) (2.16) (2.40) (2.29) (8.04) (7.99) (10.21) (10.46)
NO_INST_DED -0.0009* -0.0007 -0.0014** 0.0013** 0.0005 0.0011 -0.0001 -0.0005 0.0015
(-1.71) (-1.49) (-2.19) (2.29) (0.84) (1.016) (-0.11) (-0.72) (1.26)
NO_INST_QIX -0.00001 -0.00007 0.0002*** -0.0001** -0.00008* 0.0001 -0.00001 0.0001 0.0005***
(-0.12) (-1.46) (3.47) (-2.28) (-1.70) (0.91) (-0.18) (1.52) (3.44)
NO_INST_TRA 0.0002 0.0004** -0.0005** -0.0002** -0.0002** -0.0021*** -0.0002 -0.0001 -0.0020***
(1.68) (2.69) (-2.10) (-2.40) (-2.15) (-4.71) (-0.72) (-0.60) (-5.52)
INST_DED 0.0168 0.0004 -0.0293 0.0765*** 0.0670*** 0.0333 -0.0390** -0.0547*** 0.0329
(1.32) (0.04) (-1.05) (2.80) (2.75) (0.89) (-2.51) (-2.95) (1.48)
INST_QIX 0.0407*** 0.0186** 0.0421** -0.0192*** -0.0191*** -0.0243 -0.0142** -0.0031 0.0115
(3.27) (2.15) (2.25) (-2.96) (-3.22) (-1.60) (-2.38) (-0.45) (0.62)
INST_TRA -0.0551** -0.0395** -0.1584*** -0.0018 0.0065 -0.0959** -0.0198 -0.0055 -0.1980***
(-2.41) (-2.14) (-4.70) (-0.10) (0.33) (-2.46) (-1.52) (-0.41) (-4.63)
SIZE 0.0007 0.0008 0.0018 -0.0003 0.0064* 0.0023 0.00408* 0.0023 0.0006 -0.0023 0.0075* 0.0019 -0.0019 -0.0014 -0.0026* -0.0012 0.0032 0.0023
(0.55) (0.82) (1.19) (-0.36) (1.69) (0.73) (1.95) (1.05) (0.33) (-1.26) (1.97) (0.59) (-1.18) (-1.54) (-1.77) (-1.25) (1.67) (1.08)
RE 0.0186 0.0180* 0.0244** 0.0196* 0.0154 0.0126 -0.0065 -0.0037 -0.0065 -0.0051 0.0110 0.0078 -0.0096** -0.0124*** -0.0089** -0.0094** -0.0006 -0.0021
(1.68) (1.80) (2.26) (2.02) (1.20) (1.07) (-0.97) (-0.61) (-1.27) (-1.03) (1.07) (0.63) (-2.24) (-2.85) (-2.41) (-2.49) (-0.09) (-0.29)
ROA -0.0575** -0.0848*** -0.0436** -0.0522** 0.0208 -0.0211 0.0041 -0.0260 0.0141 -0.0069 -0.0331 -0.0634* 0.0168 0.0156 -0.0084 -0.0172 0.0263 0.0197
(-2.34) (-3.10) (-2.36) (-2.69) (0.39) (-0.50) (0.21) (-1.41) (0.86) (-0.41) (-0.88) (-1.89) (0.95) (0.97) (-0.37) (-0.76) (0.95) (0.76)
MB ratio -0.0012* -0.0017** -0.0002 -0.0013 -0.0061** -0.0078*** 0.0020* 0.0013 0.0012 0.0005 -0.0020 -0.0007 0.0035*** 0.0023** 0.0030** 0.0025** 0.0037*** 0.0019
(-1.70) (-2.38) (-0.17) (-1.68) (-2.33) (-3.81) (1.82) (1.07) (1.30) (0.55) (-1.07) (-0.36) (2.74) (2.22) (2.39) (2.56) (2.77) (1.40)
SGR -0.0125 -0.0087 -0.0107 -0.0067 0.0194 0.0023 0.0026 -0.0026 0.0070 -0.0031 0.01831 0.0337 -0.0279*** -0.0466*** -0.0378*** -0.0528*** -0.0256* -0.0460***
(-0.93) (-0.57) (-1.05) (-0.53) (0.82) (0.11) (0.24) (-0.27) (0.72) (-0.34) (0.83) (1.47) (-3.80) (-4.63) (-4.90) (-5.10) (-2.00) (-3.42)
Industry fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Adj R-square 0.0483 0.0462 0.0568 0.0560 0.0618 0.0515 0.0032 0.0060 -0.0129 -0.0012 0.0231 0.0409 0.0279 0.0219 0.0453 0.0413 0.0284 0.0282
No. of Obv 2870 2870 2870 2870 2870 2870 2530 2530 2530 2530 2530 2530 5052 5052 5052 5052 5052 5052
Table 8 (continued)
Top payers
Window(-1, +1) Window(0, +1) Window(-11, +1)
Panel B: Fama-MacBeth Regressions
Middle payers
Window(-1, +1) Window(0, +1) Window(-11, +1)
Bottome payers
Window(-1, +1) Window(0, +1) Window(-11, +1)
